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Summary 
The topic of this inquiry is of long standing interest to us and our predecessor committee, 
the Science and Technology Committee. But it is also timely: Lord Drayson, the Science 
Minister, has started a debate on the strategic priorities of research funding and there have 
recently been machinery of Government changes that have impacted on the science and 
engineering advisory system. 
This is a constructive report that reflects on some of the good work that has already taken 
place to put science and engineering at the heart of government policy. It builds on these 
achievements and makes recommendations that we believe will help to improve the use of 
science and engineering advice further. 
It revisits recommendations that we made in our recent engineering report, Engineering: 
turning ideas into reality. Although we were pleased with much of the Government’s 
response, we were disappointed that some key recommendations were not accepted. For 
example, the Government will not be calling departmental engineering advisers ‘Chief 
Engineering Advisers’, nor will it move the Government Chief Scientific Adviser and his 
Government Office for Science into the heart of Government, the Cabinet Office. 
We urge the Government to safeguard the independence of all Science Advisory 
Committees and make a number of recommendations on how this might be achieved. For 
example, we suggest that transparency could be improved and that setting up a press office 
in GO-Science would give SACs an independent voice. 
We provide a critique of the Science Minister’s debate on strategic funding priorities, and 
on Government consultations more generally, concluding that more should be done to 
clarify the aims and context of consultations. For example, what is at stake in the strategic 
priorities debate? If there will be winners, will there also be losers? Additionally, debates on 
strategic research priorities should be put in the broader context of the future of UK plc. 
The principles that govern UK science funding decisions are discussed. We conclude that 
the Haldane Principle is useful as a basis for discussion, but should be replaced with a 
principle that can accommodate regional science policy, the full range of research funding 
streams, mission driven research, and the rationalisation of detailed and strategic funding 
decisions. 
Finally, we welcome changes to the Government’s internal science scrutiny programme, 
and the House’s decision to reinstate the Science and Technology Committee. We suggest 
some ways in which the future Science and Technology Committee could operate after the 
general election. 
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1 Introduction 
Background 
1. This inquiry brought together several policy strands that have been of longstanding 
interest to this Committee and the former Science and Technology Committee. It follows, 
in particular, a number of issues that were raised in the following reports: 
— Engineering: turning ideas into reality (IUSS Cttee, Fourth Report of Session 2008–09, 
HC 50-I), on the Government’s capacity for sourcing and using engineering advice; 
— Science Budget Allocations (IUSS Cttee, Fourth Report of Session 2007–08, HC 215-I), 
on regional science policy and the Haldane Principle; and 
— Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making (S&T Cttee, Seventh Report of 
Session 2005–06, HC 900-I), on the Government’s capacity for sourcing and using 
science advice. 
2. It also proved to be timely in two respects. First, at our January 2009 Science Question 
Time, the Science Minster, the Rt Hon Lord Drayson, launched a debate about strategic 
priorities in science funding. He noted that other countries were making “strategic choices” 
regarding their economic priorities and he argued that the UK needs to have a “hard-nosed 
look at where we have real strategic advantage”.1 The nature of this debate, its content and 
purpose, has caused a stir in the science and engineering community. We seized on the 
opportunity to contribute to that debate in this report. 
3. Second, just prior to the publication of this report the Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills (DIUS), the home of science and engineering for two years, was 
closed down. It was merged with the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) to create a super-department, the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS). The potential implications of these changes to the machinery of 
Government, and the concomitant reinstatement of the Science and Technology 
Committee, make the timing of this report all the more important as we make our case for 
putting science and engineering at the heart of government policy. 
The inquiry 
The Committee invited evidence on the following issues: 
— whether the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Science and Innovation and the Council for 
Science and Technology put science and engineering at the heart of policy-making and 
whether there should be a Department for Science; 
— how Government formulates science and engineering policy (strengths and weaknesses 
of the current system); 
 
1 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008–09) 169-i, Q 2 
6    Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy 
 
 
— whether the views of the science and engineering community are, or should be, central 
to the formulation of government policy, and how the success of any consultation is 
assessed; 
— the case for a regional science policy (versus national science policy) and whether the 
Haldane principle needs updating; 
— engaging the public and increasing public confidence in science and engineering policy; 
— the role of GO-Science, DIUS and other Government departments, charities, learned 
societies, Regional Development Agencies, industry and other stakeholders in 
determining UK science and engineering policy; and 
— how government science and engineering policy should be scrutinised. 
4. We received more than 80 written submissions and held five oral evidence sessions. 
Unusually, we opened our inquiry by taking evidence from the Science Minister, Lord 
Drayson. We went on to hear from the Royal Society, the British Academy, the 
Government Office for Science, the Council for Science and Technology, a number of 
charities and other organisations promoting science, the Food Standards Agency, two 
science advisory councils, and a number of individuals. Our final session was with the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor John Beddington, and the Science 
Minister. 
5. We would like to thank everyone who contributed to the inquiry through written 
submissions and oral evidence. In particular, we would like to thank our specialist adviser, 
Professor Sir Brian Heap, whose deep understanding of the science landscape and keen 
insight into the key issues were invaluable. 
Structure of the report 
6. The report considers a broad issue—why science and engineering are important and 
why they should be at the heart of Government policy—and three more specific issues—
the debate on strategic priorities, the principles that inform science funding decisions and 
the scrutiny of science and engineering across Government. 
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2 Science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy? 
Background 
7. We approached this question—is science and engineering at the heart of Government 
policy?—from two connected, but distinct angles. First, the use of science and engineering 
advice in policy making: does the Government have effective mechanisms at its disposal for 
feeding science and engineering advice into policy? And second, science and engineering’s 
place in Government policy: what role do science and engineering play in the 
Government’s vision for UK plc?2 On both of these points, the Government has a good 
record. Regarding science and engineering advice, the former Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser, Sir David King, maintained a close relationship with the Prime Minister, 
providing crucial expert advice during the foot and mouth crisis and successfully raising 
climate change to the top of the political agenda. He also gained traction in his campaign 
for every department to have a Chief Scientific Adviser, something that the current post-
holder, Professor John Beddington, is continuing to push. 
8. Regarding the role of science and engineering in UK plc, the Government’s reports on 
Science and innovation investment framework 2004–20143 and Manufacturing: New 
Challenges, New Opportunities4 have demonstrated a long-term vision. And funding has 
matched the promises: research funding has doubled in real terms over the last 10 years.5 
The science budget is ring-fenced and is set to increase to more than £6 billion per year by 
2010–11. That commitment remains in place, with fresh enthusiasm from both the Science 
Minister, the Rt Hon Lord Drayson,6 and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, the Rt Hon Lord Mandelson.7 
The machinery of Government 
9. When we began this inquiry, the organisational arrangements were somewhat different. 
DIUS existed as a discrete department for innovation, universities and skills, and it 
provided a home for GO-Science. In between the completion of evidence-taking and 
drafting the report there were machinery of Government changes. These resulted in the 
merger of the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills and the Department for 
 
2 The reader may detect more focus on science than engineering. There are two aspects to this. First, we recently 
produced a report on engineering that covered some of the topics in this report in detail. We therefore put more 
emphasis on science in some passages of this report. Second, when we talk about funding for science and 
engineering, we specifically are talking about those aspects that fall within the Committee’s remit. For example, 
funding for engineering that falls within our remit includes research funding and FE/HE teaching, but excludes 
financial support for manufacturing. A larger part of the science policy area falls to this Committee. 
3 HM Treasury, Department of Trade and Industry and Department for Education and Skills, Science and innovation 
investment framework 2004–2014, July 2004 
4 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 
Manufacturing: New Challenges, New Opportunities, September 2008 
5 DIUS, The Allocations of the Science Budget 2008/09 to 2010/11, December 2007 
6 For example, Q 377 and oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008–09) 169-i, Q 19 
7 Speech given at the Science Museum, 9 June 2009, ‘Science at the centre of Britain’s future prosperity’ 
(www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/ministerialteam/Speeches/page51775.html) 
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Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. The resulting super-department, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), has subsumed the science aspects of 
DIUS wholesale, with no changes to the structure (yet). The figure below describes the 
structural arrangements as they were before the merger (Figure 1). 
10. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), currently Professor John 
Beddington, oversees science and engineering advice across Government and is also head 
of profession for scientists and engineers in the civil service. The GCSA heads up the 
Government Office for Science, which has cross-departmental responsibility for science 
and engineering advice. The GCSA and GO-Science are situated within the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)—formerly DIUS—rather than the Cabinet Office 
as both we and the former Science and Technology Committee have suggested.8 
11. Each Government Department, except the Treasury, has a Departmental Chief 
Scientific Adviser (DCSA). DCSAs are responsible for science and engineering advice in 
their departments. Not all DCSAs are necessarily scientists; for example, the DCSA for 
Ministry of Defence is an engineer (Professor Mark Welland), the DCSA for the Home 
Office is a social scientist (Professor Paul Wiles), and the DCSA for Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport is an economist (Anita Charlesworth). 
 
Figure 1. The structure of science and engineering advice prior to the machinery of Government 
changes of June 2009. Taken from our Fourth Report of Session 2008–09, Engineering: turning ideas 
into reality, HC 50-I, p 72. 
 
 
 
8 Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2008–09, Engineering: turning ideas 
into reality, HC 50-I, para 313 (referred to in as the ‘engineering report’); House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, HC 900-I, para 25 
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12. The DCSAs, along with the Health and Safety Executive Chief Scientist, the head of the 
Government Economic Service, a Treasury representative, the Director General of Science 
and Research, and the CSAs to the Devolved Administrations, all sit on the Chief 
Scientific Advisers Committee (CSAC). It meets quarterly to advise the GCSA (who 
chairs CSAC) on cross-departmental science and engineering matters. 
13. There are also dozens of science advisory councils and committees that assist 
Government in collating and assessing scientific information and input independent 
advice into policy-making. The highest of these councils is the Council for Science and 
Technology, which advises the Prime Minister on science and technology issues. It is co-
chaired by the GCSA and Professor Dame Janet Finch, Vice-Chancellor of Keele 
University. 
14. Also working under the broad heading of ‘specialist advice’ to Government are the 
National Statistician (Dame Karen Dunnell), the Government Chief Social Scientist 
(Professor Paul Wiles), and the joint heads of the Government Economic Service (Vicky 
Pryce, BIS, and Dave Ramsden, HM Treasury). 
15. The Minister for Science and Innovation, Lord Drayson, is the first Science Minister 
to attend Cabinet. In addition, he is in charge of research and procurement in the MoD 
and he chairs the Cabinet sub-Committee on Science and Innovation, which was 
established in 2008 “to consider issues relating to science and innovation; and report as 
necessary to the Committee on Economic Development”.9 The sub-Committee has been 
welcomed by the science and engineering communities.10 
16. Working alongside the Minister for Science and Innovation is the Director General for 
Science and Research, Professor Adrian Smith, who is responsible for science and research 
policy, including the science budget allocations and public engagement on key scientific 
issues. 
Why science and engineering are important 
17. Before we consider the importance of science and engineering advice to Government 
policy, it is worth putting science and engineering in context. First, science and engineering 
contribute substantially to the UK’s increasingly knowledge-based economy. We learnt 
during our engineering inquiry that nearly 30% of the UK’s GDP is produced by the “SET-
intensive sectors”.11 Given the importance of these sectors, the Government invests a great 
deal of money in supporting them. And for good reason: 
Research confirms that engagement between innovators and the science base creates 
real welfare benefit. An important recent study by the OECD found that 1% growth 
in public R&D leads to a 0.17% increase in total factor productivity in the long run. 
Moreover, this effect increases with the share of public science conducted in 
 
9 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/edsi.aspx 
10 For example, Ev 151 (Royal Society); Ev 177 (Campaign for Science and Engineering); Ev 182 (Biosciences Federation) 
11 IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, para 7 
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universities. Other studies confirm the positive contribution of academic research to 
economic growth.12 
18. These facts have not been lost on other countries. In 2002, the European Council called 
for EU R&D investment to reach 3% of GDP by 2010. Among OECD countries, this has 
already been reached by Finland, Sweden, Korea and Japan (see Table 1). The UK has set a 
softer target of 2.5% by 2014.13 It is currently spending 1.8%. 
 
Table 1. 2006 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
 % of GDP % financed by Target 
  Government Industry Percentage By… 
Australia 1.8 40.5 53.0   
Brazil 1.0 57.9 39.4   
China 1.4 24.7 69.1 2.0 of GDP 2010 
Finland 3.5 25.1 66.6 4.0 of GDP 2011 
France 2.1 38.4 52.2 3.0 of GDP 2012 
Germany 2.5 28.4 67.6 3.0 of GDP 2010 
India 0.7 80.8 16.1   
Ireland 1.3 30.1 59.3 2.5 of GNP 2013 
Italy 1.1 50.7 39.7   
Japan 3.4 16.2 77.1 1.0 of GDP for 
the public sector 
2010 
Korea 3.2 23.1 75.5 5.0 of GDP 2012 
Russia 1.1 61.1 28.8 2.0 of GDP 2010 
South Africa 0.9 38.2 43.9   
Spain 1.2 42.5 47.1 2.2 of GDP 2011 
Sweden 3.7 23.5 65.7 4.0 of GDP 2010 
Switzerland 2.9 22.7 69.7   
United Kingdom 1.8 31.9 45.2 2.5 of GDP 2014 
United States 2.6 29.3 64.9 3.0 of GDP  
OECD in figures 2008,14 and OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008, p 72 
 
12 HMT, DTI & DfES, Science and Innovation Framework 2004–2014, July 2004, p 149 
13 OECD, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008, November 2008, p 72 
14 www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_37417_41722336_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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19. Related to but separate from the economics are the social benefits that science and 
engineering provide. Our lives have been improved immeasurably because of science and 
engineering. Together, they have provided populations around the world with fast 
transport and communications, safe and comfortable accommodation, effective medical 
care, abundant energy, reliable and clean water and food, and infrastructures to support all 
these necessities. Science has helped us gain an understanding of how human activity is 
warming the climate, and what impact that will have on food and water security, and, 
crucially, what needs to be done to slow or reverse the warming trend. Engineering offers 
humanity hope to meet these challenges by developing clean energy sources and 
transforming our ageing buildings and transport technologies so that they are efficient and 
sustainable. 
20. Science and engineering have combined to deliver modern medicine, which in the past 
few decades has—as in all other fields—surpassed expectations. Professor Raymond Tallis, 
the physician and philosopher, described the meteoric improvements in healthcare in his 
impassioned analysis of modern medicine, Hippocratic Oaths: 
The most direct measure of success is postponement of death, and on this medicine 
has delivered handsomely. Global life expectancy has more than doubled over the 
last 140 years. Nearly two thirds of the increase in longevity in the entire history of 
the human race has occurred since 1900. If we narrow our gaze for a while and look 
simply at the data for England and Wales in the first fifty years of the NHS, the news 
remains pretty extraordinary. Infant mortality fell from 39/1000 to 7/1000 for girls 
and 30/1000 to 5/1000 for boys; and the proportion of people dying before reaching 
64 from 40% to 7%. Life expectancy at birth increased by nearly a decade—from 66 
to 74.5 for men and from 70.5 to just under 80 for women—during the second half of 
the twentieth century. If we look at the last century as a whole, the changes are even 
more amazing. Whereas the proportion of deaths that occurred between 0 and 4 
years of age was 37% in 1901, it was 0.8% in 1999; and while only 12% of deaths in 
1901 were in people above 75, 64% of all deaths in England and Wales in 1999 were 
among people over the age of 75.15 
21. He goes on to quell the implication that just science-based medicine is responsible for 
this change by acknowledging that “Increasing prosperity, better nutrition, education, 
public hygiene, housing, health and safety at work, the emergence of liberal democracies 
protecting individuals against exploitation and abuse, and social welfare policies have all 
played their part”.16 Science and engineering—and, crucially, public policies that have 
made use of scientific and engineering advice—have played a key role in all of these 
developments. 
22. We are content that the Government is both aware of what science and engineering has 
to offer, and also eager to make the most of it. When we questioned Lord Drayson, the 
Minister for Science and Innovation, he told us: 
 
15 Raymond Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: Medicine and its Discontents (Atlantic Books, 2004), p 22 
16 Raymond Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: Medicine and its Discontents (Atlantic Books, 2004), p 22 
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I think that we have made real progress over the last year in putting science and 
engineering more at the heart of government policy, and I think we can point to 
specific achievements which have helped to deliver that, but I do think that there is 
more that we need to do.17 
23. We found this forward-looking perspective reassuring and were pleased to hear it 
echoed by Professor Beddington, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, who identified 
engineering as “an issue where we really need to work harder”.18 It is in this spirit of 
recognition of the past successes of science and engineering, the Government’s efforts to 
bring specialist advice into the policy-making process and a forward-facing view to 
improve the process further that we undertook this inquiry. 
24. We were impressed by the Science Minister and Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser’s frank assessment of how science and engineering advice is used in 
Government. We were pleased to hear that they have taken up those concerns we raised 
in the engineering report and that they have an appetite to improve the use of evidence 
in policy-making. 
Previous recommendations 
25. In our recent report Engineering: turning ideas into reality,19 we made a number of 
recommendations that were pertinent to this inquiry. The Government has responded and 
is generally in agreement with our conclusions. We welcome the Government’s response, 
and were pleased to receive a detailed account of the work that is underway to increase the 
number and recognition of scientists and engineers in the Civil Service. The Government 
did not agree with all of our recommendations, in particular to do with the structure of 
scientific and engineering advice (see Figure 2). We discuss two of these rejected 
recommendations. 
Chief Engineering Advisers 
26. We argued that Chief Scientific Advisers who were engineers and spent most of their 
time offering engineering advice should be called Chief Engineering Advisers. We offered 
eight reasons why this would be a good idea. These can be found in detail in pages 92–94 of 
the engineering report, but briefly they were: 
a) because engineering advice is distinct from other kinds of advice; 
b) because engineers are best qualified to set best practice in engineering advice; 
c) because the Government should recognise the importance of engineers and the 
appointment of Chief Engineering Advisers would be one simple way of doing this; 
 
17 Q 319 
18 Q 320 
19 Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2008–09, Engineering: turning ideas 
into reality, HC 50-I 
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d) because having Chief Scientific Advisers and Chief Engineering Advisers has proved 
successful in other organisations; 
e) three examples—(i) intra-departmental, (ii) cross-departmental, (iii) external 
communications—where it would be simpler to call engineering advisers Chief 
Engineering Advisers; and 
f) because the Government already recognises other specialists’ expertise that it puts 
under the broad heading of ‘science’.20 
27. In its response, the Government does not answer these points in detail and explain, in 
the context of each point, why the status quo is preferable to giving accurate job 
descriptions. Nor does the Government separate out this recommendation from the next 
one, which is presumably why its argument for rejecting this recommendation makes no 
sense: 
The Government does not therefore accept the case for separate Chief Engineering 
Advisers at […] departmental levels. The Committee’s proposals would involve 
additional management layers and complication which would likely be counter-
productive and confusing.21 
 
Figure 2. Our engineering report recommendations for the organisation of science and engineering 
advice. 
 
 
20 IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, pp 92–94 
21 IUSS Committee, Fifth Special Report of Session 2008–09, Engineering: turning ideas into reality: Government 
Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report, HC 759, p 22 
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28. To be clear, our recommendation was that “Some departments should have 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief Scientific 
Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both”.22 It is hard to imagine how changing the 
title of staff to more accurately reflect the work they do would “involve additional 
management layers and complication” or be in any way “counterproductive” or 
“confusing”. If the Government intended to dismiss only the part of the recommendation 
that some departments should have both a DCEA and a DCSA, it should have been clear 
that that was what it was doing. It should have also provided examples, if they exist, to 
counter the comments we received from Professor Christopher Snowden, Vice-Chancellor 
and Chief Executive of the University of Surrey who was representing the Royal Academy 
of Engineering and the engineering institutions, who told us that in business, chief 
engineers and chief scientists can work very well together.23 
29. We regret that the Government failed to answer the core reasons for having 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers. We urge the Government to give fuller 
consideration to our recommendation that “Some departments should have 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief 
Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both.” 
GO-Science in the heart of Government 
30. We recommended a small change to the machinery of Government. We observed that 
the Government Chief Scientific Adviser has three main roles: 
a) he advises the Prime Minister on science and engineering matters; 
b) he oversees science and engineering advice across Government; and 
c) he is responsible for identifying emerging issues in science and engineering policy 
(foresight). 
31. He fulfils these takes with the support of the Government Office for Science, which was 
based in DIUS and now has been moved to BIS. We suggested that these core tasks could 
be performed more effectively from the centre of Central Government: the Cabinet Office. 
32. Our position is, we believe, logical. We note that there is another unit in Government 
which has almost identical roles to GO-Science; these are listed on its website as: 
a) to provide strategy and policy advice to the Prime Minister; 
b) to support government departments in developing effective strategies and policies; and 
c) to identify and effectively disseminate emerging issues and policy challenges.24 
33. It is the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit. 
 
22 IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, para 307 
23 IUSS Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into reality, para 303 
24 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy.aspx 
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34. When we asked Professor Beddington where GO-Science would be best situated, DIUS 
(as it was then, now BIS) or the Cabinet Office he told us: 
I think there are merits on both sides, but I think the key one is the link with both the 
Science Minister and the Secretary of State for DIUS, but also with the Director 
General for Research Councils, Adrian Smith, and that whole team, which are 
responsible for so much of science funding. The fact that I can walk up a floor and 
find Adrian Smith and his team and talk on a day-to-day basis makes a tremendous 
difference, whereas if I was down in Whitehall, that would be rather more difficult to 
do.25 
35. This is an interesting response. It supports our basic premise on two counts. First, 
location matters because it puts individuals in regular contact. In his current situation he is 
in contact with the people responsible for science. Second, location matters because it can 
put distance between individuals and groups, which makes it ‘rather more difficult’ for 
them to ‘talk on a day-to-day basis’. While it is important that the GCSA has close working 
relationships with the Secretary of State and Minister responsible for science and the DG 
for Science, his relationship with the Prime Minister is even more important. If location 
can make a “tremendous difference”, as Professor Beddington contends, it would be better 
for him to be based in the Cabinet Office. We note that the GCSA has seen the Prime 
Minister four times in the past year.26 This level of access is woefully inadequate and 
supports our case. 
36. We were told by Lord Drayson that “geography is not everything”.27 However, we note 
that the Government’s response to our engineering report was prepared by “the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) with a major contribution from the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)”.28 No mention of GO-Science. We 
also note that GO-Science did not produce its own annual report, but was covered in three 
pages of DIUS’s annual report.29 The location of GO-Science has resulted in an apparent 
merger with the then DIUS, now BIS. 
37. The Government had an opportunity at the last reshuffle to move GO-Science as 
per our recommendation in the engineering report. That it did not, was a missed 
opportunity. As the Government Chief Scientific Adviser explained, location matters 
because it affords daily face-to-face interaction between colleagues in the same 
building; and as he further pointed out, he has only seen the Prime Minster four times 
in the past year. We therefore appeal directly to the Prime Minster, who is responsible 
for GO-Science, to bring it into the Cabinet Office alongside the Strategy Unit. 
 
25 Q 355 
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Policy examples 
38. During the course of this inquiry, several examples were raised that highlighted 
different aspects of the importance of a competent and active scientific advisory service. 
(We dealt with the importance of engineering advice in our engineering report.) Here we 
briefly consider two such examples: the licensing of homeopathy by the MHRA; and 
literacy and numeracy interventions. 
The licensing of homeopathy by the MHRA 
39. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is the 
government agency responsible for ensuring that medicines and medical devices are both 
safe and effective. In 2006, it started licensing alternative medicines under the Traditional 
Herbal Medicines Registration Scheme. The first such product registration was for an 
arnica gel, which has been traditionally used for the symptomatic relief of muscular aches 
and pains, stiffness, sprains, bruises and swelling. 
40. In May 2009, the MHRA granted its first licence to a homeopathic medicine, for arnica 
30c pilules. The product has been licensed under the National Rules Scheme, which means 
that it can make medicinal claims. The label will read: “A homeopathic medicinal product 
used within the homeopathic tradition for symptomatic relief of sprains, muscular aches 
and bruising or swelling after contusions”.30 
41. We asked Professor Beddington what he thought about the MHRA licensing products 
for which the best scientific evidence does not show an effect beyond placebo.31 He was 
unable to comment on the specifics since he was not aware of this particular instance, but 
he did comment of the purchasing of homeopathy by the NHS: 
I did write to the Chief Medical Officer about this indicating […] that I had real 
concerns that homeopathy which had no scientific justification of mechanisms was 
being used. [… And] in terms of a cost to the National Health Service […] it is 
£390,000 in £8.4 billion or something of that sort. Subsequent to that I have taken 
this issue up with the Director General who is dealing with these matters, Professor 
Harper, to say can we explore this further, and we have had one meeting on this 
issue. If we had not then had swine flu arrive we would be continuing to follow this 
through.32 
He also went on to say that he would “look at” both the purchasing of homeopathy by the 
NHS and the MHRA’s decision to license homeopathic products.33 
42. We are reassured to hear that Professor Beddington will take steps to look at the 
MHRA’s decision to licence homeopathic products as well as the wider issue of the 
 
30 ‘Arnica pill the first homeopathic remedy to get MHRA licence’, Pulse, 12 May 2009 
31 Enrst E & Pittler MH ‘Efficacy of homeopathic arnica: a systematic review of placebo-controlled clinical trials’, Arch 
Surg, vol 133 (1998), pp 1187–90 
32 Q 389 
33 Qq 389–390 
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purchasing of homeopathy by the NHS. We hope that he will be able to bring scientific 
evidence to the centre of this complex policy issue. 
Literacy and numeracy interventions 
43. Since 2005, the Government has supported a number of reading schemes. The Every 
Child a Reader (ECAR) pilot programme cost the Government £5 million (it was matched 
with charitable funding). The Every Child Counts (ECC) and Every Child a Writer 
(ECAW) national programmes cost £169 million over three years. Every Child a Talker 
(ECAT) cost an additional £40 million. (ECAR and ECC are controlled by the Every Child 
a Chance Trust; ECAW and ECAT are separate Government-run programmes.)34 
44. In 2006, the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, announced the nationwide rollout of 
ECAR, only a year into the three-year pilot. This is problematic from an ‘evidence-based 
policy’ point of view, but even if the Government had waited for the pilot to finish it would 
have had little evidence to go on: the pilot only demonstrated that the ECAR interventions 
were better than doing nothing, because they did not include control groups conducting 
other kinds of reading interventions. As for the other projects, a recent Policy Exchange 
report commented: 
At least with ECAR, there was a developed programme ready to use, even if the 
evidence base was shakier than acknowledged. The Government’s commitment to 
Every Child Counts (ECC) and Every Child a Writer is based on nothing at all […] It 
is little more than common sense that children who received extra support for at 
least three days a week for several weeks in a row from a trained numeracy specialist 
would show significant gains in their performance [… but] this does not 
demonstrate the superiority of ECC over any other programme nor does it tell us 
anything about the costs or benefits of the programme.35 
45. We raised this issue with Professor Beddington, who was not familiar with it. He 
therefore answered in general terms: 
I think that where science appears to be done badly, it is important that I should 
draw the attention in this case to the chief scientific adviser in the appropriate 
department and say, ‘This looks to be rather poor’. [… But] I do not have a 
mechanism for looking at all science developed in government, I see that as 
devolving to the responsibilities of the individual chief scientific advisers.36 
46. Therefore, in our example, it was the responsibility of the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families DCSA, Carole Willis, to notice that these pilots were not designed to 
determine the most cost effective or best way to improve literacy and numeracy. We have 
previously lamented the lack of scientifically trained civil servants in DCSF,37 and this 
example provides justification for our concern. Either the DCSA did not recognise that 
 
34 Rising Marks, Falling Standards, Policy Exchange, 2009, pp 37–38 
35 Rising Marks, Falling Standards, Policy Exchange, 2009, pp 40–41 
36 Qq 383–384 
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these pilots were inadequate or she was not aware of their existence; neither situation is 
acceptable. 
47. We call on the DCSF Chief Scientific Adviser to explain what advice she provided, if 
any, on the Every Child literacy and numeracy programmes and report it to the House. 
48. We agree with Professor Beddington that Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers 
should have devolved responsibility for the quality of scientific advice in each 
department. On that basis, it is crucial that each DCSA has a tight grip on their 
departmental remits and have sufficient support so that problem policy areas can be 
identified and dealt with. The DCSA must challenge policy-makers to demonstrate 
clear evidence to support policy or to acknowledge that no such evidence exists. The 
GCSA needs to be advised by DCSAs of those instances where DCSAs have been 
overruled on such matters; and we further recommend that he publishes these in his 
annual report. 
Science Advisory Councils/Committees 
49. Scientific Advisory Councils/Committees (SACs; the terms ‘council’ and ‘committee’ 
are used interchangeably) assist Government by collating, assessing and making 
judgements about scientific information and providing expert advice to policy makers. The 
Council for Science and Technology’s report on How academia and government can work 
together (October 2008) describes Science Advisory Councils as follows: 
SA Councils are independent bodies that support senior departmental policy-makers 
by providing a broad range of expertise within one body. They are recognised as 
wholly independent, which inspires public confidence, accountability and increases 
the efficiency of the use of academic input to a department as they can potentially 
respond rapidly to urgent enquiries as well as identifying issues themselves that need 
investigation.38 
50. There are currently 75 SACs, ranging from the Administration of Radioactive 
Substances Advisory Committee to the Zoos Forum.39 A number of departments have 
established Departmental Science Advisory Councils (DSACs), which reflect the needs of 
their parent departments and can comprise expert scientists (including social scientists), 
economists and technologists. 
51. We took oral evidence from three advisory groups: 
• a SAC, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), which is one of the 
specialist Home Office advisory committees—although it directly advises ministers, it 
also advises the Home Office Science Advisory Committee; 
• a DSAC, Defra’s Science Advisory Council, which is the main advisory council to that 
department. It advises Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Bob Watson, and has 
a number of subject specific advisory committees feeding into it; and 
 
38 Council for Science and Technology, How academia and government can work together, October 2008, p 16 
39 www.berr.gov.uk/dius/science/science-in-govt/advice-policy-making/codeofpractice/page27719.html 
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• a non-ministerial government department, the Food Standards Agency, which feeds 
into Department of Health (DH) policy and is itself advised by a number of advisory 
councils. 
Departmental Science Advisory Councils 
52. Judy Britton, Deputy Director of the Government Office for Science, outlined the role 
of DSACs in relation to policy scrutiny: 
On the scrutiny side of things John Beddington, before he was Government Chief 
Scientific Advisor, […] is championing the idea that there should be these kinds of 
councils throughout government departments—the Home Office has one which 
learned societies sit on as well as the chairs of their scientific advisory committees. 
The idea is that they take a view across the department at a strategic level and can see 
what is going on, critique it and challenge it. He thinks these are a very valuable form 
of more internal scrutiny than a select committee.40 
53. GO-Science is working with other government departments to determine whether 
additional departmental Science Advisory Councils (SACs) might be usefully created.41 
Currently only the Ministry of Defence, Defra, the Home Office and the Food Standards 
Agency have departmental SACs. The Council for Science and Technology is in effect the 
Prime Minister’s SAC. 
54. We agree that departmental science advisory councils can provide a valuable form of 
internal scrutiny (a subject we return to in Chapter 5). Strong consideration should be 
given to increasing the number of departments that have Science Advisory Councils 
with a departmental remit. The Department of Health, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change and the Department for Transport are obvious ‘top-of-the-list’ 
candidates, with the latter two in particular needing high quality engineering advice. 
 
Figure 3. The advisory bodies from which we took evidence. 
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ACMD and the Home Office 
55. A policy issue arose in relation to Science Advisory Councils during the course of our 
inquiry. It concerned a disagreement between the Chairman of the Advisory Council on 
the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD)—which makes recommendations to Government on the 
control of dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs, including classification and 
scheduling42—and the Home Secretary. 
56. The ACMD is one of the better known Advisory Councils, because its advice to 
Government appears in the media from time to time, particularly when the Government is 
reconsidering reclassifying drugs. It has also received Parliamentary scrutiny in the past. 
The former Science and Technology Committee conducted a case study inquiry into drug 
classification as part of its overarching inquiry into scientific advice, risk and evidence in 
policy making. 
57. In early 2009, a paper written some months previously by Professor David Nutt, before 
he was appointed Chairman of the ACMD, was published in the Journal of 
Psychopharmacology. The controversial lines were: 
Drug harm can be equal to harms in other parts of life. There is not much difference 
between horse-riding and ecstasy. […] This attitude raises the critical question of 
why society tolerates—indeed encourages—certain forms of potentially harmful 
behaviour but not others such as drug use.43, 
58. On the weekend prior to the publiction of the ACMD ecstasy report, Professor Nutt 
was attacked in the media. A spokesman for ACMD quickly commented: 
The recent article by Professor David Nutt published in the Journal of 
Psychopharmacology was done in respect of his academic work and not as chair of 
the ACMD. Professor Nutt’s academic work does not prejudice that which he 
conducts as chair of the ACMD.44 
59. The then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, also criticised Professor Nutt. She told the 
House: 
I spoke to Professor Nutt about his comments this morning [9 February 2009]. I told 
him that I was surprised and profoundly disappointed by the article. I am sure that 
most people would simply not accept the link that he makes up in his article between 
horse riding and illegal drug-taking. That makes light of a serious problem, trivialises 
the dangers of drugs, shows insensitivity to the families of victims of ecstasy, and 
sends the wrong message to young people about the dangers of drugs. I made it clear 
to Professor Nutt that I felt that his comments went beyond the scientific advice that 
 
42 http://drugs.homeoffice.gov.uk/drugs-laws/acmd 
43 DJ Nutt, ‘Equasy—An overlooked addiction with implications for the current debate on drug harms’ Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, vol 23 (2009), pp 3–5 
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Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy 21 
 
I expect from him as chair of the ACMD. He apologised to me for his comments, 
and I have asked him to apologise to the families of the victims of ecstasy, too.45 
60. We asked Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, former Chairman of the ACMD, what he 
thought about Professor Nutt’s comments and whether he should have been criticised for 
them. He defended Professor Nutt robustly: 
Risk comparisons are widely made for all sorts of purposes. The ACMD does risk 
comparisons in shoe-horning substances into A, B and C. The public is often given 
risk comparisons: the numbers of people dying from tobacco consumption are 
equivalent to a jet airliner crashing once a week—this sort of thing—and the sort of 
thing that Professor Nutt was saying in that article is just one example of a widely-
used technique of revealed preference […] If David Nutt had written an article 
saying he thought that heroin and morphine should be legalised, then his position as 
Chairman of the ACMD would probably be impossible, whatever his personal views 
might have been. On this particular occasion I do not think it was appropriate for 
him to be criticised. What he did and the sort of comparisons he made were widely 
used in social sciences.46 
61. We identified support for Professor Nutt from other witnesses. Professor Lord Krebs 
told us that he thought it “quite wrong that the Government should criticise independent 
scientific advisors for publishing scientific work in the peer review literature”.47 And 
Professor Beddington wrote to the Home Secretary: 
indicating that I had real concerns that this affair had the potential of being used 
both widely and in the media more widely as a discouragement for people wishing to 
become members of science advisory committees. She responded to me in indicating 
that she felt that she supported the idea of independent advisory committees, and she 
felt this had been evidenced by her support of a number of individual 
recommendations of Professor Nutt's ACMD committee. I still feel that we need to 
be exploring this, because I think that where you have a publication which is in an 
independent peer reviewed journal, I think it is unfortunate for government to 
actually criticise that in Parliament. So I would concur with, for example, the 
comments that Lord Krebs gave you when you asked him about the same subject.48 
62. The correspondence between Professor Beddington and Jacqui Smith is provided in the 
written evidence.49 
63. We asked Professor Beddington whether he had provided public or private support to 
Professor Nutt. He told us: 
I did not write to or contact Professor Nutt, and I think perhaps in retrospect I 
perhaps should have done. I did not. So to that extent, I am more than happy to 
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share my concerns with this committee. I think that it is important that people are 
allowed to publish in peer reviewed journals without being criticised.50 
64. We agree with Lord Krebs and Professor Beddington: SAC members should not be 
criticised for publishing scientific papers or making statements as professionals, 
independent of their role as Government advisers. 
65. The independence of scientific advisers is crucial. The most important aspect of any 
scientific or engineering advice is that it is politically and ideologically neutral; it must take 
into consideration all the relevant evidence and be presented fairly and impartially. 
Independence from Government is essential for advisers so that they are free to present the 
evidence without fear of prejudice or attack from those they advise. That is why 
independence is important. 
66. But there is an additional consideration. After the Home Secretary criticised the 
ACMD Chairman, Professor Beddington noted that her actions against Professor Nutt 
might discourage people from serving on Scientific Advisory Committees. We received 
evidence that suggests his concern was not without merit. Tracey Brown, Managing 
Director of Sense About Science, told us: 
There is a serious issue in terms of the knock-on effect of this as well. […] We [Sense 
About Science] have over 3,000 scientists working with us […] and we are already 
picking up a really negative reaction to that. There was already frustration about the 
number of people who feel that their time is misused.51 
67. It is important to safeguard the independence of the advisory system. In situations 
where the independence of a SAC chairman or member is or might be threatened for 
political reasons, support should be offered by the DCSA and/or the GCSA.  
68. We welcome the steps taken by the GCSA to deal with one incident that occurred 
between the Chairman of the ACMD and the Home Secretary. Further steps that 
should have been taken are: (1) the GSCA should have written or spoken to the 
Chairman of the ACMD, letting him know that support was being provided; (2) the 
correspondence between the GCSA and the Home Secretary should have been 
published immediately so that other SAC Chairmen and the public (including the 
science community) could see that support was being offered; and (3) the GCSA should 
have provided public support for the Chairman of the ACMD and for his right to 
publish. 
69. The Government should seek specialist advice prior to making policy decisions, 
early in the policy-making process. Clearly the Government should be free to reject the 
advice of its SACs, since scientific evidence is only one factor—albeit a very important 
one—in policy decisions: Advisers advise, Ministers decide. However, when the 
Government does take a different policy decision to that recommended by a SAC, it 
should make clear its reasons for doing so. 
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The Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees 
70. All SACs are expected—although not required—to adhere to the Code of Practice for 
Scientific Advisory Committees. The Code of Practice “promotes good practice in the 
operation of Scientific Advisory Committees (SACs) and their relationship with 
Government”.52 The code was last updated at the end of 2007 in response to 
recommendations in the Science and Technology Committee’s Scientific Advice, Risk and 
Evidence Based Policy Making report.53 The 2007 updates, for which explanations are given 
in the Consultation on the update to the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory 
Committees54 document, include changes such as dropping the term ‘lay’ and encouraging 
Chairmen and secretariats to maintain clear records to assist scrutiny. 
71. We are supportive of the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees and 
below make a number of suggestions that we hope might improve both the Code of 
Practice and the operation of SACs across Government. We appreciate that the 
Government has just updated the Code, and suggest that our recommendations, which 
amount to relatively minor alterations, should be considered at the same time as the 
Government Chief Scientific Adviser considers his Guidelines on Scientific Analysis in 
Policy Making.55 
Independence 
72. Throughout the Code of Practice, the concept of ‘independence’ is key. We also 
received many submissions that put an emphasis on the independence of science and the 
importance of independent advice and advisers.56 However, ‘independent’ is a slippery 
term. Most of the professional and learned societies offer ‘independent’ advice, but what 
does that mean? Independent from whom or what? What is clear is that ‘independent’, in 
this context, should not be confused with ‘objective’: professional and learned societies 
serve the interests of their membership or fellowship. (That of course does not detract from 
the fact that scientific or engineering knowledge has a special kind of independence that 
other kinds of knowledge do not possess.) 
73. We conclude that there would be value in being clear in the Code of Practice as to 
what ‘independence’ means. Members of Science Advisory Committees are likely to 
represent the views of their constituencies; what is important is that they have no 
conflict of interest with Government. Therefore, in the case of Science Advisory 
Committees, ‘independence’ should mean ‘independence from Government’. 
 
52 Government Office for Science, Consultation on the update to the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory 
Committees: Summary of Responses and Government Response to consultation, December 2007, p 2 
53 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making, 
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Membership 
74. Different SACs require different membership structures in order to maximise their 
effectiveness. This is well recognised and is manifested in the wide range of SAC 
memberships across Government. For example, the ACMD has 35 members and Defra’s 
DSAC has 13 members. The ACMD is made up of people from academia, the police, social 
work, psychiatrists and so on. Defra’s DSAC is mostly made up of academics. 
75. When we spoke to Dame Deidre Hutton, Chair of the Food Standards Agency, she 
explained that the FSA has lay people on the board, on advisory councils and throughout 
the agency. She regarded them as “extraordinarily important” because they could highlight 
“what the real issues are for the public in terms of their acceptance of risk” and they could 
also “frame the questions that the scientists look at right at the beginning of the process”.57 
76. Professor Gaskell, Chairman of Defra’s DSAC, framed the issue of lay membership in a 
different light. He was concerned that the term ‘lay’ “can be used pejoratively”, but felt that 
instead it should be used to suggest “another skill set which is of value to the committee”.58 
Although he argued that “they do have a role to play; they do bring a different perspective” 
and that “lay members often bring […] a capacity to ask the awkward and inconvenient 
question”, he clearly felt uneasy with the term ‘lay’, preferring to focus on individual 
expertise: 
In our committee, […] in many senses many of the people there are lay for 80/90% 
of the time because it is the main issue of the day which somebody else has got the 
FRS in and they have not […] We have a number of social scientists on our Science 
Advisory Council and, of course, they will bring a different perspective from the 
natural scientist. So I think the term ‘lay’ is encompassed by a range of inputs across 
the council, and we are very clear that we are expecting council members to 
contribute to the business of the Council even when it is not their specialty area and 
in that sense act as a lay member.59 
77. The Government shares Professor Gaskell’s view. In its summary of the consultation 
responses on the Code of Practice, it stated: 
The Government supports the revision of the Code to drop the term ‘lay’ in favour of 
SACs developing a competence-based approach to accessing the required skills for 
each SAC through person specifications […] SACs can thereby retain some 
flexibility in shaping their membership and that of the secretariat in consultation 
with their sponsoring department to meet changes in circumstance.60 
78. We agree that SACs should recruit members based on competencies. However, we 
are concerned that dropping the term ‘lay’ removes an expectation that specialist 
advisory councils should have non-specialist members. Additionally, we are not 
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convinced by the argument that scientists from one subject are necessarily a ‘lay’ person 
in another scientific area. Whether or not they are called ‘lay members’, non-specialists 
do have a lot to offer specialist committees. The presumption should be that SACs have 
lay/non-specialist members. 
Transparency 
79. The Code of Practice is very clear on the importance of transparency, stating that 
“Scientific advisory committees should operate from a presumption of openness”.61 This 
applies to both documentation—publication of agendas, minutes, programmes of work, 
final advice and annual reports—and the meetings themselves. 
80. We found widespread support for transparency. Openness about the advice offered to 
Government is the best way to guard the independence of SACs, and to be seen to be 
independent, which is also important.62 Open meetings were seen as both a way to 
communicate the work of the SACs and also to gain important feedback on their work.63 
SACs routinely publish their documentation online, and many hold open meetings. We 
noted Professor Rawlins suggestion that SAC meetings should be open “by default”, adding 
that if meetings are closed there should be “very special reasons”.64 
81. Given the enthusiasm for open meetings, and the obvious benefits that are derived 
from improved transparency—particularly in terms of communication with the public and 
maintaining independence from Government—we are attracted to the idea of holding 
meetings in public as a matter of course. New media, such as webcasting, could also be 
used to extend further the reach of the advisory committees.65 
82. We support the Code of Practice’s emphasis on the importance of publishing 
documents relating to the work of science advisory committees. We would prefer a 
slightly different emphasis on open meetings. Rather than recommending that SACs 
“should aim to hold open meetings on a regular basis”, we suggest that SACs “should 
aim to hold the majority of their meetings in public, making use of new media wherever 
possible”. 
83. One area in which transparency is important is the process of SACs presenting their 
advice to Ministers. A spectrum of options can be imagined where, at one end, SAC advice 
is published to the media at the same time as it is presented to Ministers: complete 
transparency. At the other end, SAC advice might be given to Ministers in confidence, 
several weeks in advance of publication, so that lengthy consideration can be given to the 
evidence, its policy implications and a communication strategy, and changes made to the 
evidence if necessary: no transparency (or independence). Neither of these options are 
desirable, and current practice lies in between. Professor Rawlins told us: 
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The ACMD has part-closed meetings, because ministers have asked that the 
decisions should be made in closed meetings so that they are provided to ministers 
before they get into the public domain. That is an argument you can have with 
ministers, but that was their request.66 
84. We can see the logic and agree that it is important that SAC advice should be 
presented to Ministers in advance of publication, giving them sufficient time to 
consider a response. However, it is also clear that SAC advice should, when it is given to 
Ministers, be final advice, and not a launching pad for debate. On this basis, we 
recommend that the process of SACs providing evidence to Ministers should be as 
transparent as possible. SAC evidence that is presented to Ministers should 
subsequently be published in unaltered form, along with the date on which the evidence 
was presented to Ministers and the details of any requests for alterations or 
clarifications of the evidence. 
Communication with the media 
85. Connected to this is a problem about the way in which SAC advice is communicated to 
the media. SACs typically use their home department’s press office. We received evidence 
that indicates that this sometimes causes problems. Using the example of the ACMD and 
Home Office, the Science Media Centre told us that: 
In both the cannabis and ecstasy cases the Home Office decided that the media 
launch of the evidence and recommendations from the expert group would coincide 
with the official reaction to those recommendations by the Home Secretary. This 
immediately transformed the media story from one about scientific evidence likely to 
be covered by science reporters, into a political story about a row between advisors 
and ministers covered by home affairs and political reporters. Even if there had been 
no disagreement, merging these two distinct events had the effect of doing the 
following: 
a) the scientists were denied the opportunity to brief specialist science reporters and 
focus on communicating the substantial scientific evidence which had informed 
their recommendations; 
b) the wider public and policy makers were also denied the opportunity to read the 
evidence as presented by the independent advisers, and so a key opportunity to 
inform this contentious debate with some scientific evidence was lost. 
Because the press officers for the ACMD work for the Home Office press office there 
was an immediate conflict of interest when key recommendations of that 
independent committee conflicted with government policy.67 
86. When conflict between advice and policy occurs, there should be an opportunity for 
informed public debate about the reasons for disregarding or downgrading the importance 
of scientific advice. The Government may have very good reasons for disregarding 
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67 Ev 290 
Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy 27 
 
scientific evidence, and it is entitled to use its press office to make its case. However, this 
should not impede the quality of press office service that SACs receive. Therefore, it is 
important that SACs have access to an independent press office. The obvious place for a 
small press office serving all the SACs is within the Government Office for Science. We 
note that GO-Science until recently shared a press office with DIUS, and presumably will 
now share with BIS. This raises similar concerns and we believe that it should have its own 
press capabilities in any case. We recommend that a small press office be set up within 
the Government Office for Science, to serve the press needs of GO-Science and all the 
Science Advisory Committees across Government. 
Conclusion 
87. In this chapter we have discussed a number of specific aspects of the science and 
engineering advisory system, from its structure to a detailed look at the Science Advisory 
Councils. To conclude this chapter we return to the broader issue of the place of science 
and engineering advice in Government. The latest changes to the machinery of 
Government have brought this issue to the fore and we welcome the opportunity to 
comment on them here. 
88. Shuffling the body responsible for providing cross-departmental science and 
engineering advice from one department to another and then back again within the 
space of two years is the opposite of ‘putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy’. It reduces science and engineering advice to, at best, a peripheral 
policy concern, and, at worst, a political bargaining chip. If science and engineering are 
to be successfully placed at the heart of policy, as the Government is keen to do, two 
things need to happen. First, the Government Office for Science (and Engineering, as 
we would have it) should have a stable home. We believe that this should be the Cabinet 
Office: the heart of Government. Second, there needs to be a Government Chief 
Engineer and a Government Chief Scientist, who are responsible for cross-
departmental advice and coordination, freeing up the Government Chief Scientific 
(and Engineering) Adviser to advise the Prime Minister more closely and to act as a 
public figurehead for science and engineering in the United Kingdom. 
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3 Debating strategic priorities 
Background 
89. On 26 January 2009, the Committee held its first Science Question Time with the 
Minister for Science and Innovation, Lord Drayson. During this session, the Minister 
suggested that the UK should identify, and concentrate support on, areas of research in 
which the UK could: (a) be world leading; and (b) have the potential to provide significant 
economic returns on any investment: 
I am calling for a serious debate about the areas of focus for this country in the 
future. […] That is a debate which I know will cause some interest, but I do think it is 
one which we need to have because it is the reality of the environment in which we 
operate as a country.68 
I think it would be actually good for the country to get a clear sense of what it is we 
think we can lead the world in over the next ten years.69 
90. Asked by the Chairman whether he had “the bottle to lead this debate”, Lord Drayson 
replied “Yes”70 and added “It is a bit late now if I have not!”71 
91. Following our session with the Science Minister, a number of speeches and public 
comments were made about this debate. (Hereafter, it is called the ‘strategic priorities 
debate’.)  
92. On 4 February 2009, Lord Drayson gave a speech at the Foundation for Science and 
Technology, in which he outlined further the context:  
This evening I want to stimulate a debate on our national science and innovation 
strategy, and whether it is adequately geared up to cope with the future. Since day 
one in this job, the global economic downturn has dominated. With its origins firmly 
linked to systemic problems in the global financial system, the current downturn has 
been more severe and more rapid than anything we’ve seen in recent memory. 
I can relate personally to the impact of recession on businesses and on people. As an 
undergraduate apprentice sponsored by British Leyland in 1979, I well remember 
Red Robbo's picket lines ranged in front of K Gate at Longbridge and saw a once-
great business collapsing before my eyes. 
As a science entrepreneur, during the difficult period of the early ‘90s, I had to make 
colleagues redundant, and I had the bank manager threaten to put my company into 
receivership unless I came up with the money to pay off the business overdraft. 
 
68 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008–09) 169-i, Q6 
69 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008–09) 169-i, Q 16 
70 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2009, HC (2008–09) 169-i, Q 10 
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I got through those tough times, but those experiences taught me some lessons. Like 
the importance of having a broad portfolio of products and services; not relying too 
much on one area which can expose you to sudden risk; of knowing what your 
strengths are – and playing to them. And being aware of limited resources – and 
investing them wisely. 
I mention these lessons because I believe we should ask ourselves—in the midst of 
this global downturn—are we applying these lessons well enough to our science and 
innovation policy? 
[…] What are the future growth areas? Where will future jobs and wealth come 
from? Where does the UK really have the potential to take world-class science and 
build world-class business from it? What is government’s role in facilitating this 
transition? 
Peter Mandelson has argued for a new industrial activism, where government sets 
out a strategic framework as a bridge to the future, where business and investors have 
confidence in the long-term direction. 
What is the role of science policy here? 
[…] Has the time come for the UK—as part of a clear economic strategy—to make 
choices about the balance of investment in science and innovation to favour those 
areas in which the UK has clear competitive advantage? 72 
93. These are serious questions, which instinctively cause unease because they raise 
questions about whether the Government is planning a return—albeit more strategically—
to the policy of picking winners, the British Leyland mention acting as an uncomfortable 
reminder. We return to this question later. 
94. It also raises questions about the Government’s vision for UK science. The Science 
Minister, the then Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Prime Minister have all made strong 
commitments to ‘pure’, curiosity-driven research.73 As the Royal Academy of Engineering 
put it: “All political speeches to date on the subject have stressed that this vision is about 
reaping the benefits of research already funded and that the commitment to curiosity-
driven research funding remains unaffected”.74 
95. Despite this, there have been concerns in the academic community that an increased 
focus on translation will amount to decreased focus, and possibly reduced funding, on 
basic science. These concerns have centred on: the changes to the Research Council 
funding application process so that each funding application—including basic research 
with no immediate or obvious application—must be accompanied by impact plans that 
should demonstrate the contribution that the research will make to society and the 
 
72 www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/lord_drayson/fst 
73 Lord Drayson: www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/lord_drayson/fst; 
John Denham MP: www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/speeches/john_denham/science_funding; 
Lord Mandelson: www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/ministerialteam/Speeches/page51775.html; and 
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economy; the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework, which will include an 
assessment of the economic and social impact of research;75 and steps that have been taken 
to refocus research funding on priority areas supporting “key areas of economic 
potential”.76 
What is the debate about? 
96. Putting these concerns to one side for a moment, we should first ask what this debate is 
about. Our initial question was whether Lord Drayson was calling for a debate about 
whether the UK should be more strategic in its approach to funding science, or a debate 
about how the UK should be more strategic. We asked several players and received a 
mixture of responses. 
97. Lord Drayson, the initiator of the debate, told us that he intended this to be a debate 
about whether the UK needs to be more strategic: 
My point in raising the topic as a debate was to stimulate a serious debate about 
whether or not the science community felt that we should apply more focus to 
decision-making around research priorities […]77 
And after agreement to discuss how: 
and also to encourage them, should they come to that conclusion, as to make 
recommendations as to how that should be done.78 
98. However, when he launched the debate at the January 2009 Science Question Time, he 
said that he believed that there would need to be “more concentrations” in the UK’s 
research spend,79 as if the debate would be about how to determine the strategic focus. 
99. Professor Adrian Smith, Director General for Science and Research, argued that this is 
about whether there should be more focussed research funding.80 Iain Gray, Chief 
Executive of the Technology Strategy Board, disagreed: “My belief is it is how we are going 
to do it. It is about focus, identifying areas that we are going to make a big difference in.”81 
100. John Denham, the then Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, was 
not clear. On balance, his comments seem to suggest that the debate is about how to be 
more strategic with funding: 
We believe that we should have that discussion about how they organise research to 
ensure that we maintain fundamental research and get the maximum economic 
benefit from the substantial investment that we make in research. That is under way. 
 
75 www.hefce.ac.uk/Research/ref 
76 HM Treasury, Budget 2009, April 2009, p 130 
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It is not an ‘if’—we are doing it. It is a discussion that the research councils are 
having.82 
101. Nick Dusic from the Campaign for Science and Engineering was, like us, confused: 
“We have had Lord Drayson’s, John Denham’s and the Prime Minister’s speech, and each 
has a different focus on this issue”.83 
102. The second area of confusion was raised by both the Institute of Physics and the 
Medical Research Council (MRC). They pointed out that key to the debate was what Lord 
Drayson meant by ‘competitive advantage’: “Should we infer that advantage is used here in 
an industrial, financial, or intellectual sense?”84 If he means scientifically competitive, the 
MRC argued, “the Research Councils already do this in supporting excellence through peer 
review”.85 If he meant economically competitive “any policy would need to recognise that 
the UK needs to grow new strengths as well as building on existing ones”.86 
103. The third and most significant misunderstanding was that the debate would probably 
result in a major shift of policy towards science funding. This was certainly our 
understanding: when he launched the debate at Science Question Time, Lord Drayson 
indicated that there would need to be concentration in science funding.87 This apparently is 
not the case. When we later asked him if there would be a government policy 
announcement as a result of the debate, he succinctly replied: “No”.88 
104. We have since, however, heard that Lord Mandelson has indicated that a decision has 
been taken to push ahead with prioritising applied research. In a speech in which he talked 
about his “commitment to maintaining the support and standards of scientific research”, 
he declared: “and I don’t mean only applied research, which will obviously receive greater 
emphasis, but fundamental science as well” (emphasis added).89 
105. We are left wondering what this strategic priorities debate was about and whether 
it has led to a major shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about 
how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward from its 
investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the Government should be clear in its 
own mind about the format and goals of a debate before launching it. (This 
recommendation is expanded later in the chapter.) 
Picking winners? 
106. Some aspects of this debate seemed to us to share characteristics with the ‘picking 
winners’ policy of the 1970s. Lord Drayson did not launch this debate in isolation. It 
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followed an announcement by the Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson, that the 
government would support industry through the recession in what he described as 
“market-based industrial activism”.90 
107. This new industrial activism, the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee, is not 
the old picking winners philosophy of, as he put it, “taking one company or a second 
company and saying that we were going to back this single company to the hilt”.91 Rather it 
is about backing the development of skills and research in successful sectors in the UK 
economy.92 But this raises the same problem that bedevilled the policies of the 1970s when 
decisions were made about which companies to back. Now it seems the Government will 
have to make decisions about which sectors to back. The Chairman asked the Prime 
Minister how he intended to do this during a Liaison Committee session in February 2009. 
The Prime Minister replied that “they pick themselves”.93 
108. Do they? During our major inquiry into engineering, we conducted a case study 
inquiry into plastic electronics. We discovered during the course of that inquiry that the 
plastic electronics industry “is likely to grow substantially over the next few years” and that 
“the UK’s research base puts it in a unique position to capitalise on this growth”.94 
However, during the course of the inquiry we witnessed potentially successful UK start-ups 
folding or moving overseas. It was clear that the UK was missing out “on the opportunity 
to exploit the economic potential offered by the commercialisation of innovative 
technologies”.95 Industries do not ‘pick themselves’. In the case of plastic electronics, the 
USA, Germany and Japan were picking the UK’s start-ups and turning them into winners; 
the UK was losing out. 
109. Past experience of failing to accurately ‘pick winners’ has led to a risk-averse 
executive. The belief that ‘sectors will pick themselves’ is misplaced and when proactive 
interventions by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries 
that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support one sector over 
another will be difficult. The Government should develop clear and agreed 
methodologies for determining priorities and acceptability of risk. 
110. There is another side to this point: with a finite budget, if one is to pick winners and 
give them extra funding, money must be withdrawn from something else, the losers. We 
saw the detrimental impact that shifting priorities can cause when we looked at one 
Research Council, the Science and Technology Facilities Council, as part of our Science 
Budget Allocations inquiry.96 The impact of increasing the focus of the whole research 
budget on, say, energy security or biotech, would be larger and could cause irreparable 
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damage to many research sectors. We have pushed the Science Minister on this point, but 
have been unable to elicit a clear answer. For example: 
Chairman: […] you would be arguing within the cabinet that in research terms, we 
should in fact be putting greater resources into these areas like medicine and life 
sciences, and in so doing at the expense of what? […] 
Lord Drayson: Firstly I would say that the very nature of science means that you 
need to have the underpinning science across the piece, so for example to do good 
life science research you still need to have good statisticians, you still need to have 
good physics.97 
111. If the Government is to develop clear and agreed methodologies for identifying 
areas of high priority, these must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. 
Further, the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides to prioritise 
some areas of research it should come clean about which areas of research will see 
reduced investment. 
International partnerships 
112. The UK’s science and engineering industries are among the strongest in the world. 
The three ‘Bs’, BP, BA and BT are, for example, some of the largest multinationals in their 
respective sectors, and the UK’s pharmaceutical sector continues to do well. Similarly, the 
UK’s science and engineering research base is very strong and attracts the world’s best 
researchers, both to work in British universities and also to engage in international 
collaboration. The UK has played a lead or key role in several high profile international 
research projects, such as the human genome project, the Large Hadron Collider and 
building the ITER fusion reactor. 
113. We noted in our engineering report, however, that the UK was absent in some 
important nuclear engineering research projects. While this should not distract from the 
UK’s considerable strength in this area, it was clear to us that a relatively small amount of 
funding would facilitate a large amount of collaborative international research activity, 
from which the UK would likely draw significant economic benefits in the decades to 
come. We suggested to the Government that it should commission the National Nuclear 
Laboratory to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on international R&D.98 The Government 
rejected this in favour of a more hands-off approach, allowing the NNL to take the lead in 
assessing the UK’s options should it choose to do so.99 
114. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills should consider long-term 
investment returns when it considers strategic priorities in international partnerships. 
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Directed and non-directed research 
115. Before moving to the final part of this chapter, it is important, having stated our 
support for having a debate about strategic science funding, to restate the importance of 
basic research. The late Lord Porter, the former President of the Royal Society, famously 
once said that there are two kinds of science: applied and not yet applied. We asked 
Professor Lord Krebs about the balance between ‘applied and not yet applied’ research. He 
gave us an illustrative example of the effectiveness of basic science, which is worth 
reproducing in full: 
Last night I happened to bump into one of our Nobel Prize winners, Tim Hunt, who 
won a Nobel Prize a few years ago for his discoveries relating to cancer research. I 
asked him the question that you are putting to us, should the Government focus on 
key areas of priority and he said absolutely not. If you want to foster the kind of 
innovative research that led to him winning a Nobel Prize you should allow great 
freedom for scientists to propose research and judge it on excellence. He made the 
point to me that the greater the originality of research the less predictable the 
outcomes are likely to be. [...] I pointed to a very nice study that was described by Sir 
William Paten a few years ago in his book Man and Mouse in which he looked at ten 
key advances in cardiovascular medicine and he traced back where those key 
advances came from and he identified about 600 papers in the literature that led to 
these key medical developments. Over 40% of them had nothing to do with 
cardiovascular medicine at all and many of them were not carried out in medical 
departments or medical faculties; they were carried out in departments of chemistry, 
engineering, physics, botany, agriculture, zoology, et cetera. I think the difficulty with 
prioritisation is the inherent unpredictability of where the key advances are going to 
come from. If I could just add one more point, it is not that I am totally against 
having key themes—indeed, when I was chief executive of NERC we did have certain 
key themes broadly defined and the research councils have that mechanism today—
but I do think that the key themes and the priorities should be presented in a broad 
way so that the scientists can be innovative within those themes and not be too 
prescriptive. I agree with Lord Rees that we do not want to see a shift in the balance 
between strategically directed research and responsive mode.100 
116. Professor Fisk added: 
I am reminded of Karl Popper’s observation that if you were going to predict the 
wheel essentially you would have just invented it. It is very hard to talk about picking 
winners in science. I do contend—I do not know if this is a consensus with my 
colleagues—that it is a jolly sight easier to spot losers.101 
117. Curiosity-driven research is a key component of a successful knowledge-economy. 
We strongly endorse the view that increased focus in applied research and industrial 
follow-through should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is one of the 
UK’s greatest strengths. 
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Consultation 
118. The final part of this chapter explores consultation. The Government is committed to 
using consultation to make better policy: 
This Government is committed to effective consultation; consultation which is 
targeted at, and easily accessible to, those with a clear interest in the policy in 
question. Effective consultation brings to light valuable information which the 
Government can use to design effective solutions. Put simply, effective consultation 
allows the Government to make informed decisions on matters of policy, to improve 
the delivery of public services, and to improve the accountability of public bodies.102 
119. There are two kinds of consultation that the Government uses: formal and informal. 
We have received submissions on both kinds and here we briefly comment on each. We 
consider both the formal Science and Society consultation that DIUS launched in July 
2008, and the informal strategic priorities debate. 
Formal consultation: Science and Society 
120. The Science and Society consultation was launched by the then Science Minister, Ian 
Pearson MP. It was presented as a “consultation on developing a new strategy for the 
UK”.103 In particular, the Minister said: 
I believe we need a society that is excited by science; values its importance to our 
social and economic wellbeing; feels confident in its use; and supports a 
representative well-qualified scientific workforce. […] I believe we now need a more 
mature relationship between science, policy and society, with each group working to 
better understand the needs, concerns, aspirations and ways of working of the 
others.104 
121. The consultation attracted 3,200 question responses from more than 400 individuals, 
organisations and umbrella groups from across business, education, media, policy, science 
and the third sector.105 A summary of responses was collated; the key messages were: 
a) the UK should aim to have a science-literate population that is critically engaged and a 
skilled, representative scientific workforce; this will best be achieved by: 
i. joining up science and society activities, with an enhanced role for the Government 
as co-ordinator and enabler of science and society activities; 
ii. recognising school and college science education as the underpinning of national 
STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills; 
iii. increasing the connectivity between the science community, the media, education 
and industry; and 
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iv. improving the equality and diversity amongst those studying and working in 
science and engineering disciplines; 
b) more use needs to be made of social science in public engagement and STEM issues.106 
122. Running through this list, it is not clear how useful this consultation was. The 
Government was already committed to improving the STEM qualifications of the 
population as part of its drive towards a knowledge economy; school was already identified 
as a key vehicle to meet those aims and the Government has taken a number of steps to 
improve STEM teaching and participation; many initiatives that link the science 
community to the wider world already receive Government support; and equality and 
diversity are core values in just about every part of what the Government does. The notion 
that the Government should play an enhanced role as a co-ordinator and enabler of science 
and society activities is tantamount to the science and society community asking for more 
money and co-ordination, which was fairly predictable. And the charge that the 
Government could make better use of social science has been well made previously.107 
123. We asked Tracey Brown, Managing Director of Sense About Science, what she 
thought about the consultation. She commented: 
It is such an enormous range of subjects that were covered that it did just re-pose the 
questions in the end and I think they found themselves with something perhaps 
rather overwhelming because it was not very focused. One of my frustrations is that 
there is very little being invited in the way of true evaluation of what had gone before, 
which I suspect might be because there is a lot of incentive to talk about the fact that 
money was well-spent, and therefore nobody wants to ask the really difficult 
questions about where it might not have been so well-spent. Surely, actually, that is 
where you are going to develop quite a useful set of insights into what should be 
developed in the future. It is only a summary that has been produced and they are 
now looking to evaluate that summary, but the hands-off almost no comment feel to 
it is quite strong.108 
124. Sir Roland Jackson, Chief Executive of the British Science Association, added: 
I would say that what the consultation, as far as I have seen it so far, has shown—
perhaps not surprisingly—is how diverse and complex what we call public 
engagement is. [… T]rying to capture it all under one heading is a bit too difficult.109 
125. On 26 May 2009, the Government announced the formation of five Expert Groups 
that will engage the science community, media, public, business and policy makers “to help 
change cultural attitudes to science in the UK”.110 Lord Drayson explained that “a 
significant outcome from the consultation is that respondents want us—Government—to 
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take a more active role”.111 Therefore, these groups have been set up to look at: how to 
demonstrate the relevance of science to everyday life; partnerships between the media and 
scientists; science and learning; science careers; and how science and engineering can be 
socially responsible and ethical. 
126. It is unlikely that the Science and Society consultation will contribute substantially 
to “a new strategy for the UK”: most of what has been said was either predictable or 
already government policy. However, we will watch the work of the Expert Groups with 
interest. 
Informal consultation: strategic science funding 
127. We have discussed the debate on strategic science funding in terms of content, and we 
have made clear our support for the notion of a debate on whether science funding should 
be more strategic. Now we consider it as an example of informal consultation. 
128. The first problem that faced this consultation is that nobody really knew what was 
being discussed. As we highlighted above, the Government has not even managed to make 
it clear whether this was a debate about whether science funding should be more focussed 
or about how to focus science funding. We asked Lord Drayson if, in hindsight, following 
the confusion, it would have been better to conduct a more formal consultation, perhaps 
publishing a Green Paper on strategic science funding as a basis for discussion. Lord 
Drayson replied: 
I have thought about this, and in retrospect, no, I do not. I think that the way in 
which the debate was able to be initiated as quickly as it was by the method which I 
took, the way in which it was very effective, I must say, in stimulating response, so 
there was no shortage of response to the debate, in fact it had a useful by-product, I 
believe, in contributing to the raising of the overall profile of the importance of 
science as part of the debate about our response to the economic downturn.112 
129. The points about starting the debate quickly and raising science into discussions about 
economic recovery are well made. But the point about the lack of clarity in the debate was 
not satisfactorily answered. We discovered that the clarity issue was not isolated to this 
debate. Sense About Science told us: “There seems to be a tendency in science and policy 
engagement to be coy about the existence of debates and misconceptions, making only 
euphemistic reference to them”.113 Tracey Brown later gave an example: 
For example […] the recent consultation that started two years ago on the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act update made reference to things being 
controversial, for instance, and did not explain why they are controversial or actually 
on what basis the Government assumed them to be controversial.114 
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130. But it is not just clarity about the content of consultations that is the problem. Another 
issue is clarity about what is at stake in a consultation. 
One of the biggest problems is not knowing what is at stake. [… S]ometimes what is 
at stake only becomes clear at some later stage of implementation, and then the 
scientists get told off for the fact that they did not realise quickly enough that this was 
going to wipe out their use of a particular procedure, for example. We had this with 
the Tissue Bill, we had it with the Physical Agents Directive[115] and so forth.116 
131. The problem of what is at stake is something that has plagued the informal 
consultation on strategic science funding. Much of the agitation in the science community 
has come about over concern that the Government is going to take money away from basic 
science to do more applied science. If the Government had made it clear from the outset 
whether this debate was about (a) if a more strategic approach to all science funding was 
required, or (b) how to be more strategic in terms of focussing just the applied research, the 
resulting responses may have been more constructive. Whether or not the Government 
feels that it has been clear on this matter, the extent of the confusion among respondents 
demonstrates that more could have been done to make it clear what was at stake. For 
example, the production of a single document to which the Government could point—or 
even a single speech, rather than the several public speeches that were made on the issue—
would have been useful. 
132. We welcome the Government’s commitment to consultation. It would be helpful if 
the Government was clearer about the reasons for each consultation and what was at 
stake. This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned and would 
remove the feeling of ‘box-ticking’ that so often accompanies consultations. 
133. In the case of the strategic-priorities debate, the benefits of a fast-moving process 
have been countered by a lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper 
or something similar would have given a focus to the debate that was sorely lacking. We 
acknowledge that this would have elongated the timeframe for the debate, but since the 
intention was always for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a 
problem. 
Conclusion 
134. In some senses this debate on strategic priorities has been a distraction. At the outset, 
our plan was to examine whether the Government places science and engineering at the 
heart of policy, and if not, how it should do so. This debate has narrowed our focus 
somewhat into a number of smaller, but important, questions. If we step back a moment 
from the issue of whether or not the UK needs to make choices about “the balance of 
investment in science and innovation to favour those areas in which the UK has clear 
competitive advantage”,117 there are a number of broader questions into which this fits. The 
most important may be: what role will science and engineering play in the future UK 
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economy? From it run a series of questions about science, engineering, education, 
academia, industry, international competition and co-operation, and—the subject of this 
chapter—strategic investment in R&D. It seems important that in asking the question 
about strategic science funding, the broader picture about the future role of science and 
engineering in the UK economy should be revisited. 
135. AstraZenca told us: 
If the UK is to remain globally competitive it must create and enact a robust, long-
term national science and engineering strategy that stretches from fundamental 
science through to applied and translational activities that will ensure economic 
impact and rapid exploitation.118 
136. We could not agree more. 
137. Any debate on strategic science funding should be put in the wider context of the 
role of science and engineering in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 
2004 ten-year science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention 
on the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that the UK needs a 
‘national science and engineering strategy’. The Government should spend the last two-
years of the ten-year framework (2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and innovation 
framework and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction of travel for 
science and engineering within UK plc from 2014 until 2024. 
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4 The Haldane Principle 
History of the Haldane Principle 
138. The Haldane Principle is popularly used to describe the notion that “decisions about 
what to spend research funds on should be made by researchers rather than politicians”.119 
It is supposedly derived from Lord Haldane’s 1918 report on the machinery of 
Government (hereafter called the Haldane Report), which was written against the 
backdrop of the First World War. In relation to research funding, which had for several 
years being focused very strongly on the war effort, the key recommendation was to 
separate out departmental research from ‘intelligence and research for general use’. The 
general research, it was proposed, should be carried out by ‘Advisory Councils’ (today’s 
Research Councils), which would be overseen by a “Minister specifically appointed on the 
ground of his suitability to preside over a separate Department of Intelligence and 
Research, which would no longer act under a Committee of the Privy Council, and would 
take its place among the most important Departments of Government”.120 
139. Lord Haldane’s recommendations were largely based on the practice of a Committee 
that impressed him: the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research.121 Some of them sound familiar to us today; for example, that research proposals 
were presented to an Advisory Council, “consisting of a small number of eminent men of 
science”.122 However, some do not fit too neatly with today’s interpretation; for example, 
that “all proposals for expenditure are referred for sanction” to the Minister.123 
140. Although Lord Haldane was clearly supportive of a light touch approach from a 
Minister who was free of normal departmental duties,124 nowhere in the report does he 
explicitly lay out a principle akin to the one bearing his name today. As Professor David 
Edgerton, from the Imperial College Centre for the History of Science, Technology and 
Medicine, put it: “There is no Haldane Principle and never has been”.125 
141. According to Professor Edgerton, what we now consider to be the Haldane Principle 
actually derives from the early 1960s when the then Rt Hon Quintin Hogg MP (later Lord 
Hailsham), who was concerned about the Labour Opposition’s plans to increase the central 
control of research through the then Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
argued: 
Ever since 1915 it has been considered axiomatic that responsibility for industrial 
research and development is better exercised in conjunction with research in the 
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medical, agricultural and other fields on what I have called the Haldane principle 
through an independent council of industrialists, scientists and other eminent 
persons and not directly by a Government Department itself.126 
142. In 1972, Lord Rothschild provided an alternative to the Haldane Principle, the 
customer-contractor principle. In his report A Framework for Government Research and 
Development, he stated “The concepts of scientific independence used in the Haldane 
Report are not relevant to contemporary discussion of government research”.127 
Rothschild’s principle made the Government Department or Government Chief Scientist 
the ‘customer’ who commissioned ‘contractors’, the Research Councils and Universities, to 
do research. This was a move away from investigator-led research on the grounds that: 
However distinguished, intelligent and practical scientists may be, they cannot 
decide what the needs of the nation are, and their priorities, as those responsible for 
ensuring those needs are met.128  
143. The customer-contractor principle brought with it a “greater scrutiny of the activities 
of scientists, a need for scientists to justify more clearly their demands upon public 
resources, and a generally tougher financial environment”.129 
144. Government involvement in science research priorities continued to grow throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. In response to the House of Lords Science and Technology Select 
Committee’s report on Civil R&D,130 the Government: 
• placed strategic priorities for research under the consideration of Ministers and the PM 
during the public expenditure round; 
• set up the Science and Technology Assessment Office within the Cabinet Office and 
established “clear objectives for expenditure and developed systematic criteria for 
assessing and managing research”;131 and 
• asked research bodies to consider the national benefits of their work, including the 
economic impact and commercial exploitation of their work. 
145. In 1992, the science portfolio was moved to a Cabinet Minister, the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, and the Office of Science and Technology (OST) was set up as a non-
Ministerial department, headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. In addition to 
having responsibility for the UK’s science budget, the OST was charged with developing 
the Government’s science policy nationally and internationally.  
146. In 1993, the OST White Paper Realising Our Potential declared that:  
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[…] day to day decisions for Research Councils on the scientific merits of different 
strategies and projects should be taken by the Research Councils without 
Government involvement. There is, however, a preceding level of broad priority 
setting between general classes of activity where a range of criteria must be brought 
to bear.132 
147. This was a modern rendition of the Haldane Principle in all but name. 
The Haldane Principle today 
148. The then Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills put his mark on the 
Haldane Principle in April 2008: 
For many years, the British government has been guided by the Haldane principle—
that detailed decisions on how research money is spent are for the science 
community to make through the research councils. 
Our basis for funding research is also enshrined in the Science and Technology Act 
of 1965, which gives the Secretary of State power to direct the research councils—
and, in practice, respects the spirit of the Haldane principle. 
In practice, of course, Haldane has been interpreted to a greater or lesser extent over 
the years, not least when Ted Heath transferred a quarter of research council funding 
to government departments—a move undone by Margaret Thatcher. 
But in the 21st century, I think three fundamental elements remain entirely valid. 
— That researchers are best placed to determine detailed priorities. 
— That the government's role is to set the over-arching strategy; and 
— That the research councils are ‘guardians of the independence of science’.133 
149. We will briefly discuss each of these threads. 
Researchers are best placed to determine detailed priorities 
150. We received many submissions in support of this concept. Professor Lord Krebs 
reminded us that key advances are often heavily dependent on basic science that has 
nothing to do with the innovation in question.134 He used the example of cardiovascular 
medicine, but one could similarly use MRI scanning: 
[T]he use of Magnetic Resonance Imaging in diagnostics was a product of decades of 
fundamental physics and chemistry research into the properties of atomic nuclei.135 
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151. Or penicillin,136 or Teflon,137 or superconductivity,138 and so on.139 As the British 
Academy put it: “Applied research relies on the foundations that have been developed by 
basic research.”140 The University of Oxford similarly commented: 
The fundamental character of research is evolutionary. That is, ideas are generated, 
explored and categorised. Some turn out to be fruitful but many don’t. This means 
that a sufficiently broad research base is needed both to generate the ideas and to 
recognise and exploit them. In most cases these two functions are not coterminal and 
do not arise from the same persons or groups. Therefore there is an inherent danger 
in ‘focusing’ that risks the functioning of the enterprise as a whole.141 
Government’s role is to set the over-arching strategy 
152. The issue of whether the Government should set the over-arching strategy is similarly 
simple to support. The Government provides the money; it seems only reasonable that is 
should be able to set broad themes for areas of research. Professor Lord Krebs, who is 
strongly opposed to a prescriptive role for Government in research decisions, nonetheless 
commented: 
[I]t is not that I am totally against having key themes—indeed, when I was chief 
executive of NERC we did have certain key themes broadly defined and the research 
councils have that mechanism today—but I do think that the key themes and the 
priorities should be presented in a broad way so that the scientists can be innovative 
within those themes and not be too prescriptive.142 
153. Rather, the difficulty is defining the relationship between an ‘over-arching strategy’ 
and ‘detailed decisions’. If one views the research that is funded by the Research Councils 
as static there is no obvious conflict: the Government suggests topics that it considers 
important and the Research Councils fund research in those areas through open 
competition. However, matters are complicated when the funding regime changes: the 
Government changes the priority of a strategic area of research and the Research Councils 
stop funding research in one area and start funding it in another. In this situation it is clear 
how the over-arching strategy at a given point in time can have a discrete and predictable 
impact on detailed funding decisions. 
154. The most recent example of this took place in the 2009 Budget, which provided that 
the Research Councils were to make £224 million of savings143 “by reducing administration 
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costs” and—this is the key point—“refocusing spend on new research priorities”.144 
Although the Government has said that the Research Councils will decide how the money 
will be spent, the rules about how the money can be spent have been set by Treasury. In 
this case, the Treasury has allowed “refocusing spend on new research priorities” to count 
as value for money savings.145 In other words, when old grants run out in low-priority areas 
and they are replaced by grants in high-priority areas, that counts as a saving. This funding 
rule means that Research Councils must concentrate more of their funding into specific 
research areas, which are known in advance by Government. 
155. The 2009 Budget Research Council savings have had an impact on the way that 
Research Councils allocate their funds. While this cannot be regarded as dictating 
‘detailed decisions’, it is not ‘over-arching strategy’ either; it is somewhere in between. 
156. We have another problem with this decision. It was announced that the Research 
Councils are the only Government bodies to have their value for money savings reinvested 
internally.146 This is hardly surprising given that much of these ‘savings’ are in fact a cost 
neutral refocusing of the budget; the ‘savings’ have not freed up any cash that could be 
spent elsewhere. These ‘savings’ are in reality a strategic influencing of research funding 
streams. Whether or not it is the right thing to do is open to debate. But, either way, the 
Government should communicate clearly what it is doing and not label them as 
something they are not. 
157. To conclude, we are in favour of the idea that researchers are best placed to make 
detailed funding decisions on the one hand and, in principle, we support the 
Government to set the over-arching strategic direction on the other. However, it is 
necessary for the Government to spell out the relationship between these two notions 
for a broader funding principle to be of any use. 
Research Councils are ‘guardians of the independence of science’ 
158. We were surprised to see this being said at all, let alone as part of the Haldane 
Principle. As Professor Edgerton put it: 
I do not think anyone has ever thought of the research councils as the defenders of 
the independence of science—that is a very odd definition indeed and I hope we have 
not actually got that. Learned societies, universities and individual academics are the 
custodians of the independence of science.147 
159. Research Councils are not, and never have been, the ‘guardians of the 
independence of science’. That responsibility has historically lain, and should remain, 
with the learned societies, universities and individual academics. 
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Science Budget Allocation letters 
160. During our inquiry on the CSR07 Science Budget Allocations we encountered 
concern over the level of control that the Government exercised over the research 
budget.148 To clarify the issue, we asked to see the letters that the Government sent to each 
of the Research Councils laying out the details of their allocations. 
161. The fact that the letters are not published causes us concern on two counts. First, there 
is the principle of transparency. The basis for decisions on how public money is spent is the 
public’s business; and these are not small sums of money: many billions of pounds will be 
handed over to the Research Councils in the coming years. 
162. Second, the letters should throw some light on how much control the Government 
had over how the Research Councils were to spend the money they were given. The 
allocation letters to the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC) are published as a matter of course, and although 
Professor Adrian Smith, Director General of Science and Research, told us that the 
equivalent to the HEFCE and LSC letters would be the Allocations Booklet, which is 
published,149 Nick Dusic, Director of the Campaign for Science and Engineering, told us 
that “the science budget allocation booklet gives us the high-level commitments for the 
different research councils [… but] not the rationale”.150 
163. Freedom of Information requests to see the allocation letters from the Campaign for 
Science and Engineering and us were turned down. We then asked the Government to see 
the letters in confidence, but we were refused again. Most recently, we asked the then 
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Rt Hon John Denham MP, 
why he was refusing to hand over the letters: 
Chairman: We accept that you are not going to publish [the science budget 
allocation letters], but the reason we want to see them is that there is a suggestion 
that the Government is taking an overly prescriptive role in determining the way the 
Research Councils spend their money. Given the fact that the Osmotherly Rules 
state, July 2005, that the Government is committed to being as open and as helpful as 
possible with select committees and that, indeed, during your time as a select 
committee chairman you received from Charles Clarke, the then Home Secretary, 
papers which were very sensitive but were relevant to a committee inquiry, could you 
give us an explanation as to why you are digging your heels in and not allowing the 
committee to have those on a confidential, not to publish, basis, and will you 
reconsider? 
Mr Denham: Chairman, I would never refuse a request from you to reconsider, so I 
promise you I will go away and look at it again. The view that I have taken up to now 
is that it does raise a precedent for the release of papers which were intended to be 
confidential which I am concerned about. I would say two things. I will go and 
consider it again, because you have raised it with me quite fairly. I would also say to 
 
148 IUSS Committee, Science Budget Allocations, pp 12–14 
149 Q 183 
150 Qq 193–195 
46    Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy 
 
 
you, Chairman, this may come as a surprise to my officials, but as we look forward to 
the next allocation process, which we have already discussed with you as to ways in 
which we can make that more consultative, perhaps we can find a way which avoids 
this situation happening again.151 
164. We are sorry to report that we still have not seen these letters. 
165.  The Government’s refusal to give us confidential access to papers relevant to this 
inquiry is unacceptable. Without seeing the Science Budget Allocation letters, we are 
forced to speculate that the Government has exerted inappropriate influence over the 
Research Councils. However, we have been unable to confirm or deny this suspicion 
because of the Government’s contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny. 
Regional science policy 
166. The Haldane Principle has a close associate called the Excellence Principle which 
stipulates that decisions about what science to fund should be made principally on the 
excellence of the science. To put it simply, the Excellence Principle guides the Research 
Councils in spending their research funds; the Haldane Principle guides the Government, 
encouraging it to leave the Research Councils free to apply the Excellence Principle. 
167. The Government defines the Excellence Principle as follows: 
Public funding of research at a national level, through the Research Councils and 
funding bodies, is dedicated to supporting excellent research, irrespective of its UK 
location. The ‘excellence principle’ is fundamental to safeguarding the international 
standing and scientific credibility of UK science and research and supporting an 
excellent, diverse, expanding and dynamic science base, providing value for money 
for public investment.152 
168. One potential difficulty with the Excellence Principle, as noted in the 10-year 
framework, is that it “results in geographical disparities in research funding”.153 It is easy to 
see why this might happen: once a critical mass of excellence is reached in a particular 
location, it attracts a high percentage of the available research funds and research in that 
area grows further. This presumably accounts in no small way to the large quantities of 
research funding that are won in the ‘golden triangle’ (London, Oxford and Cambridge), 
leaving an apparent lower level of funding in other parts of the UK. It is worth noting, 
however, that if one normalises the amount of funding won by each region by either 
population or the number of research institutes, the variance in regional funding is less 
extreme.154 
169. On the face of it, the Excellence Principle is a good thing because it keeps science 
competitive and sends the money where it is most likely to produce the best results. 
However, there is a clash with another very important concept. The Government views 
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science and innovation as key factors in economic development. This is a long-standing 
position that has been reaffirmed many times since the current economic crisis started.155 
When one combines the view that science and engineering are important for the economic 
health of a region, on the one hand, with Government’s responsibility for the economic 
health of the region, on the other, one logically arrives at a policy whereby the Government 
makes strategic decisions regarding the economic health of regions by influencing where 
research money is spent. 
170. To paraphrase: there is a fundamental clash between the Government’s commitment 
to the Excellence Principle as currently stated on the one hand, and its responsibility for 
ensuring the economic health of the regions on the other. We explored this problem 
during our inquiry into the Science Budget Allocations and made the point that the 
Government was not being clear about how decisions are made about regional science 
funding.156 
171. The Government responded by saying that it was “committed to excellent science and 
research, wherever this may be in the United Kingdom”,157 and argued that in order to 
maximise the role of research and innovation in economic performance in the regions, 
“regional and national bodies need to co-ordinate their funding and strategies”.158 The 
response does not include a list of regional and national bodies that need to work together. 
And the document to which the response points (Science and innovation investment 
framework 2004–2014) only gives one example: the Science Research Investment Fund, 
which includes a capital stream “that can help universities improve their capacity to 
compete on the basis of excellence”.159 It is a good example of how Government can 
support both the Excellence Principle and encourage strategic science funding for the 
regions, but why did the Government not use it, or others—if there are any—in its 
response? It comes back to our original point, which was not that the Excellence Principle 
and the notion that science and engineering are important for the economic health of the 
regions are impossibly incompatible, but that the Government is not being clear about how 
it rationalises the two concepts. 
172. Lord Drayson has already accepted that while excellence is the primary driver for 
decisions about funding major science facilities, there is a regional dimension too.160 And 
according to the Regional Studies Association, it is a relatively simple fix: 
The Haldane principle is generally only applied to research in the research councils 
sector, and whilst there has been some shift towards politically determined 
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programmes in selected areas the principle of academics deciding on the award of 
funds still holds. This principle need not be altered dramatically to achieve a 
rebalancing of research between regions as much of the emphasis needs to be placed 
on creating new centres and facilities outside of the research council remit.161 
173. Logically, the Government cannot support both the Excellence and Haldane 
Principles in their current form and be responsible for promoting science and 
engineering as a means of economic recovery and growth in the regions. The time is 
ripe for an unambiguous rationalisation of the two concepts. Researchers, industry, 
regional and national policy makers and the public have a right to know on what basis 
research funding is distributed both nationally and regionally; the rationale for funding 
decisions should be transparent and rigorous. The Government should adjust the 
framework for research funding and regional development so that it does not contain 
internal contradictions. 
174. An additional beneficiary of this recommendation would be the Government. During 
the Science Budget Allocations inquiry, the Government got itself in a muddle about 
whether or not it had a regional science policy: 
The Minister told us that “We want to develop Daresbury as a world-class centre for 
science and innovation”, but went on to say that the Government does not want to 
“get to a situation where [we are] dictating to research councils that a certain 
percentage of their budget has to be spent in a certain region”. However, the Minister 
has subsequently said that “individual delivery plans [of Research Councils] should 
be in accordance with the strategic priorities of the government, which includes a 
clear regional element, because we want to see Daresbury developed as a world-class 
centre for science and innovation”.162 
175. When we visited the USA, we learnt about a well established regional science policy 
called the Experimental Programme to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR).163 The 
programme’s aim is to strengthen research and education in science and engineering and 
to avoid undue concentration. Most of the top research in the US is concentrated in 
facilities in states along the east and west coasts, and EPSCoR allocates resources to inland 
states that do not have top-level facilities. We were told that the programme was both long-
standing and controversial, but that it was yielding results; for example, one inland state 
was on the point where it would soon graduate above the threshold for EPSCoR support. 
176. Science and engineering are crucial to the economic wellbeing of every region in 
the UK, and development strategies that have supported and made use of science and 
engineering have proven successful. In the consideration of UK science policy, it is 
essential that the regional dimension is clearly and publicly set out. It is important that 
the Government is able to communicate its role in regional development and in science 
policy, and especially the relationship between the two. It will only be able to do this if it 
resolves the conflict between its regional policies and the Haldane Principle. 
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A multitude of funding relationships 
177. So far we have identified two major problems with the Haldane Principle. The first is 
the false dichotomy of ‘detailed decisions’ made by the Research Councils on the one hand, 
and the ‘over-arching strategy’ set by Government on the other. The second is that the 
Haldane Principle (and its close relation the Excellence Principle) clashes with the 
Government’s responsibility for ensuring that the regions have access to science and 
engineering excellence so that their economies can benefit. 
178. There is a third problem. The Haldane Principle only applies, in practice, to the 
Research Councils. That is fine, as far as it goes, but the research landscape is far more 
complicated than just a binary relationship between Government and the Research 
Councils. There are also related institutions such as the Technology Strategy Board (ca £1 
billion over CSR07) and the Energy Technologies Institute (ca £550 million over ten years), 
which are supported by a range of different funding streams. The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (formerly DIUS) awards annual grants to three National Academies 
that fund research (the Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering and the British 
Academy, at £247 million over CSR07). There are the Large Science Facilities Fund (£508 
million over CSR07), University Research Capital Investment (£740 million from the 
science budget and £824 million from HEFCE over CSR07), the Higher Education 
Innovation Fund (£297 million from the science budget and £99 million from HEFCE), 
and the Public Sector Research Establishments Exploitation Fund (£37.5 million over 
CSR07), which in turn funds a number of Research Council Institutes, cultural institutions, 
NHS regions and departmental research bodies.164 And that is just DIUS (as it was). 
179. Several other departments have research budgets, including the Ministry of Defence, 
the Department of Health, and Defra, and there is also a regional dimension to funding: 
There is a strong case for expanding on the Haldane Principle in light of the money 
and authority now held by the devolved governments and the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs). It is almost universally embraced that university research funding 
should be driven by the quality of the science and coordinated through the research 
councils. However, we believe that there is currently a question mark over the 
effectiveness of the Haldane Principle in insulating this funding from government 
directions, and particularly the role of the RDAs in this area.165 
180. We have created four broad-brush maps that go some way towards demonstrating the 
multifaceted relationship between Government and all the research that it funds. It does so 
through a multitude of organisations. It would be inappropriate for the same relationship 
to exist between each of these organisations and Government. 
181. The relationships between the Government and the research bodies that it funds 
should be both explicit and transparent. We recommend that the different streams of 
research funding are mapped and the nature of the contract between Government and 
the research bodies described. 
 
164 See The Allocations of the Science Budget 2008/09 to 2010/11, DIUS, December 2007, for the full science budget 
figures. 
165 Ev 111 (Institute of Physics) 
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Mission driven research 
182. A fourth criticism we have heard of the Haldane Principle is that it has perpetuated 
“the situation whereby the application of research funding fails to match the challenges 
facing the economy, industry and society at large”.166 To put it another way, it has bolstered 
curiosity-driven research, but done little to support mission-driven research and 
development. We have already discussed at length strategic focus of research funds and this 
is a connected theme. It is worth pursuing in this context, because we received several calls 
for a dual approach to research in the UK. The Royal Society of Edinburgh, for example, is 
a strong supporter of the dual approach: 
It is the solution that emerged post-war in the United States and that has been so 
successful. It has created a diverse and adaptable basic research enterprise, coupled 
with sustained, long term investment in ‘platform’ technologies that ultimately 
provide perennial spin-off that can be exploited by companies that pull strongly on 
the research base for technological solutions, and has been further stimulated in 
recent decades by the power of public procurement through the SBIR scheme. For 
example, a mission-driven component of national strategy might have been more 
effective, ten years ago, in ensuring that the UK exploited its early lead in stem-cell 
technologies in the period when stem-cell research in the USA was restricted. We 
need to see initiatives actively designed to create new global winners in the UK 
economy. This should involve initiatives from the NHS, MOD, Local and National 
Government, HMRC etc. It should also involve bodies from the wider public sector 
such as OfCom. All public agencies should expect congratulation if they help one or 
more British companies to build commercial success.167 
183. The Royal Academy of Engineering put it in a different light: 
The Haldane Principle […] has different meanings when applied to the direction of 
science and engineering research. For pure science, it seems reasonable that 
researchers themselves should be best placed to understand what direction their 
research should proceed in and they should not be constrained in their academic 
endeavours. For engineering, on the other hand, it seems reasonable that 
Government should express requirements in terms of general challenges that can be 
met through directed research and expect researchers to be able to contribute to the 
development of solutions to wider policy deployment problems.168 
184. However one thinks of the issue, it is well-known that the UK’s immense strength in 
basic science is not matched by its follow-through into economic benefits. According to the 
CBI: “the UK still lacks the mission-driven ethos that is prevalent in competitor countries 
such as the US, where DARPA, NASA and other agencies lead the way in engaging 
business and universities to find solutions to real world problems”.169 While the creation of 
the Technology Strategy Board has resulted in a marked increase in support and focus on 
 
166 Ev 205 (BAE Systems) 
167 Ev 254 
168 Ev 200 
169 Ev 103 
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user-defined and challenge-led research, some have argued that it has not gone far enough. 
The Royal Academy of Engineering suggests that “the TSB’s budget should arguably be of 
the same order of magnitude as the Research Councils’ as a whole”.170 
185. We have already given our support for a more strategic approach to setting 
priorities in science funding, specifically at the applied end of the spectrum. 
Considering this issue in the context of the Haldane Principle highlights the need for a 
new approach to science funding that incorporates the good elements of Haldane in 
relation to basic science, but does not hinder a more mission-driven approach to get the 
full benefits of applied science and engineering. 
A new research funding principle 
186. Although there is support in the science community for the Haldane Principle insofar 
as it provides for the independence of researchers,171 we also received a number of 
submissions that called for a new or updated Haldane Principle.172 Professor Fisk told us 
that: 
It is my impression that the Haldane Principle was dead in the early 1980s. It is a 
1918 principle. Apart from Magna Carta I cannot think of any other principle that 
ancient that clutters around in public life and I think actually its term is positively 
unhelpful for the end point you want to have. […] In most other countries there is an 
analogous principle but it is one about the freedom of the academic community in 
public life to contribute to the quality of public life. […] My own feeling is that we 
ought to be much clearer on what we think is the value of independent research in a 
world which is always changing.173 
187. The Royal Society agreed: “Rather than a debate about what Haldane meant in 1918, 
we need a better understanding about the way in which the Government now interprets 
the Haldane Principle”.174 And the UK Deans of Science made an intriguing suggestion, the 
later part of which we discuss in the next chapter: “We believe that the time has come for a 
serious discussion about the Haldane Principle, something that could be one of the first 
inquiries carried out by a re-formed Science and Technology Select Committee”.175 
188. The time has come for a new framework to replace the Haldane Principle (however 
it is understood) that adds transparency and rigour to the relationship between 
Government and the research community. It is important that the diversity of 
relationships between Government and the various bodies it funds to do research are 
included under a broad set of principles. We recommend that the Council for Science 
and Technology be commissioned to carry out this work. 
 
170 Ev 277 
171 Ev 75 (Unite the Union); Ev 83 (Natural History Museum); Ev 94 (AstraZeneca); Ev 111 (Institute of Physics); Ev 137 
(Imperial College London); Ev 149 (John Innes Centre & Institute for Food Research); Ev 258 (Royal Society of 
Chemistry) 
172 Ev 106 (BRE Global); Ev 181 (Regional Studies Association) 
173 Q 62 
174 Ev 151 
175 Ev 118 
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5 Science and engineering scrutiny 
Introduction 
189. There are guidelines on the use of science, a Government Office for Science, several 
Chief Scientific Advisers, and hundreds of scientists and engineers throughout the civil 
service, and yet—inevitably—mistakes happen. The former Science and Technology 
Committee’s inquiry on evidence-based policy and our own inquiry on engineering each 
highlighted several examples where science and engineering were not at the heart of 
Government policy. 
190. In the absence of a perfect system, when guidelines and good intentions are not 
enough, scrutiny becomes a key player. Our starting point for this chapter is that good 
scrutiny of science and engineering issues across Government is important. We consider 
two broad types of scrutiny: internal and external. 
Internal scrutiny 
191. Internal scrutiny is that provided by the Government looking in on itself. Following a 
recommendation made in Investing in Innovation: A strategy for science, engineering and 
technology,176 Sir David King, the then Government Chief Scientific Adviser, set up a 
Science Review Team in what is now the Government Office for Science. The reviews were 
“to independently scrutinise and benchmark the quality and use of science in government 
departments”.177 Since 2005, six departments have been reviewed: the Food Standards 
Agency; the Department of Health; the Home Office/Ministry of Justice; the Department 
for Culture Media and Sport; Communities and Local Government; the Health and Safety 
Executive and Defra. Each review took about a year, although some took longer. 
192. We asked Professor Beddington about the Science Reviews. He told us that the time 
the reviews took was “ludicrous”,178 and that when he was involved in the Defra review “it 
seemed to be going on forever”179 (18 months, to be precise). Therefore, soon after taking 
up his post as GCSA, he commissioned “a review of reviews”,180 which led to a decision 
that: 
The new reviews will be significantly shorter, maximum three months; they will be 
conducted in a completely different way from other reviews. They will be jointly 
owned by the Permanent Secretary of the department concerned and myself, and 
they will be driven at a very high level. There will be an immediate going in to look 
and see what are the key issue and if some things worry us, then we would start to 
look at those in more detail. […] The pattern of reviews which we would then plan to 
start early in 2009 should mean that we will be able to get a lot more done; we will be 
 
176 HM Treasury, July 2002 
177 www.dius.gov.uk/partner_organisations/office_for_science/science_in_government/science_and_engineering_assurance/background 
178 IUSS Committee, Third Report of Session 2008–09, DIUS’s Departmental Report 2008, HC 51-II, Q 243 
179 IUSS Committee, DIUS’s Departmental Report 2008, Q 243 
180 IUSS Committee, DIUS’s Departmental Report 2008, Q 243 
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using consultants to help us and we will be using a much higher level of professional 
input into these reviews.181 
193. This new programme is called ‘Science and Engineering Assurance’. The objectives of 
the new assurance exercise are to: “Provide departments with assurance that their policy 
and practice properly reflects the [natural and physical] scientific evidence [… and] Ensure 
that departments have in place the capability, systems and culture to access, quality assure 
and use science effectively”.182 We have since been updated on the progress of Science and 
Engineering Assurance by Professor Beddington: 
[W]e reached agreement about two weeks ago that these would be mandatory for 
any department or institution that has not actually already had a review. For those 
that have […] we are in the process of ongoing assessment of how they are 
performing against a particular review […]. The aim is to complete this exercise of 
having done a science and engineering review of all departments by March 2011, so 
it is a relatively quick timescale to get them, and this includes things of very different 
sizes, it includes the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury.183 
194. Changes to the science and engineering scrutiny programme to make reviews 
shorter and mandatory are welcome. We recommend that there should be regular and 
constructive liaison between the newly formed Science and Technology Committee and 
the Science and Engineering Assurance team. 
External scrutiny 
195. We turn now to external science and engineering scrutiny. External scrutiny comes in 
many forms. The media provides a key role, both the mainstream media and increasingly 
through the work of bloggers. The professional and learned societies, industry, unions and 
charities also provide scrutiny on science and engineering issues in a variety of ways. 
Enough could be said about external science and engineering scrutiny to fill several reports, 
but we shall take up here only one aspect: the scrutiny role played by Parliament through 
the work of select committees. 
196. Science and engineering issues transcend departmental boundaries and therefore have 
been covered in one way or another by many different select committees in dozens of 
reports. For example, the Environmental Audit Committee often considers scientific issues 
associated with climate change and engineering issues associated with reducing carbon 
emissions (this will similarly be a challenge for the relatively new Energy and Climate 
Change Committee). Scientific and engineering challenges are pertinent to much of the 
work of the Transport Committee, the International Development Committee, the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, the Health Committee and the Defence 
Committee, to name a few. However, in terms of focus on science and engineering issues, 
the most relevant Committees are the former House of Commons Science and Technology 
 
181 IUSS Committee, DIUS’s Departmental Report 2008, Q 243 
182 www.dius.gov.uk/partner_organisations/office_for_science/science_in_government/science_and_engineering_assurance 
183 Q 324 
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Committee, the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, this Committee and 
the future reinstated Science and Technology Committee.  
A brief history of science scrutiny in the House of Commons 
197. The House of Commons first established a Science and Technology (S&T) Select 
Committee in 1966. It existed for the duration of the 1966–1971 Parliament and was re-
appointed in 1971 and 1974. The Committee was abolished in 1979 when the departmental 
select committee structure was established. In 1992, a new S&T Committee was established 
to scrutinise the newly formed Office for Science and Technology (OST). Since the OST 
(later the Office for Science and Innovation) had a cross-departmental remit, so in practice 
did the S&T Committee.184 
198. The Committee came to an end in November 2007 following the Prime Minister’s 
announced changes to the machinery of Government in July of that year. DTI and DfES 
were divided into three departments: BERR, DCSF and DIUS. The responsibilities of the 
Office for Science and Innovation were taken over by the DIUS Science and Innovation 
Group and the Government Office for Science, which sat within DIUS. 
199. The S&T Committee existed under Standing Order No 152 to scrutinise the work of 
the OSI. The abolition of the OSI meant that the Standing Order had to be amended. On 
25 July 2007, the House agreed a motion to amend the Standing Order to replace the 
Science and Technology Committee with a departmental select committee, which would 
scrutinise the work of DIUS. Originally the Innovation, Universities and Skills Committee, 
the later addition of ‘science’ into its title—which ran contrary to the normal practice of 
committee names reflecting the name of the department that they scrutinised—reflected 
the particular importance we attached to scrutinising the work of the Government Office 
for Science. 
200. As well as our duty to scrutinise all of the work of DIUS, across the important and 
broad universities and skills agendas, we have also conducted some science and 
engineering scrutiny. In the 2007–08 session, we had the third busiest schedule of all the 
departmental select committees: 
During the 2007–08 Session we held 50 Committee meetings and 12 Sub-Committee 
meetings and took oral evidence on 46 occasions. We published seven Reports and 
over and above the evidence for these inquiries also held 11 separate oral evidence 
hearings.185 
201. We have conducted several inquiries on science and engineering issues. In reverse 
order these were: two pre-appointment hearings with the Chair-elects of the Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council; 
a major inquiry into engineering; biosecurity in UK research laboratories; renewable 
electricity-generation technologies; and the Science Budget Allocations. We also reinstated 
Science Question Time with the Science Minister. 
 
184 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006–07, The Last Report, HC 
1108, p 5 
185 IUSS Committee, Second Report of Session 2008-09, The Work of the Committee in 2007–08, HC 49, para 7 
Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy 59 
 
202. Our work has been appreciated by a wide range of individuals and organisations.186 
Lord Drayson told us that “scrutiny of science and engineering and technology within 
Government is incredibly important and becoming only more important in the future”,187 
and that our focus on “putting science and engineering more at the heart of government 
policy” has been “helpful”.188 
203. However, we received evidence of frustration at the Committee’s wide remit and the 
implications for science scrutiny. Professor Ian Haines, from the UK Deans of Science, told 
us: 
In our evidence we suggested there should be [a science and technology committee 
re-established]; it is not the suggestion that the Chairman is not doing his job, nor is 
it the suggestion that the members are not doing their job, it is just that we feel that 
the Committee is too broad. From innovation—and that is economic innovation—
on the one hand, right the way through to skills of all kinds of an undescribed nature, 
it is too big.189 
204. The Royal Society expressed its concern about “the extent to which the current (IUSS) 
Committee can scrutinise policies that fall at the boundaries of, or cut across, 
Departments”.190 This view was also expressed by the Institute of Physics,191 the Biosciences 
Federation,192 the Science Council,193 the Royal Academy of Engineering194 and the Royal 
Society of Chemistry.195 
205. Recent changes to the machinery of Government added urgency to the debate: DIUS 
and BERR were dissolved and all their responsibilities passed to a new department, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. This affects select committees that have 
been established under Standing Order No 152, as ours is, because they mirror government 
departments. That means that both the IUSS and Business and Enterprise Committees 
were set to be replaced by a single Business, Innovation and Skills Committee. In our 
report on The future of science scrutiny following the merger of DIUS and BERR, we argued 
strongly that the BIS Committee would be in a worse position than the IUSS Committee to 
scrutinise science and engineering given all the other areas it will have to cover.196 We 
therefore recommended the re-forming of a Science and Technology Committee.197 
 
186 Ev 83 (Natural History Museum); Ev 87 (UK Computing Research Committee); Ev 138 (Research Strategy Office, 
Imperial College London); Ev 148 (Arts and Humanities Research Council); Ev 158 (SSC Science Cluster); Ev 168 
(Research Councils UK); Ev 224 (Sense About Science) 
187 Q 392 
188 Q 319 
189 Q 215 
190 Ev 155 
191 Ev 113 
192 Ev 183 
193 Ev 199 
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195 Ev 219 
196 IUSS Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2008–09, The future of science scrutiny following the merger of 
DIUS and BERR, HC 662, para 7 
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206. On 25 June 2009 the House agreed with us and the many other voices from the 
science and engineering community who felt that science and technology needed dedicated 
Parliamentary scrutiny. Standing Order No 152 was duly amended and on 1 October 2009 
the IUSS Committee will cease to exist and the Science and Technology Committee will 
come to life. 
207. We would like to thank all those who made strong representation to the Leader of 
the House on our behalf. We also recognise the responsibility that derives from a 
consensus in Parliament and the science and engineering community that science and 
technology scrutiny matters. We will strive to make the work of the new Committee—
which is essential for the democratic scrutiny of science, engineering and technology—
relevant, rigorous and transparent. 
The future Science and Technology Committee 
208. The decision to create a Science and Technology Committee was right, but the way in 
which the Committee was formed was related to machinery of Government changes and 
the speed with which the changes had to be made. In this final section of the chapter we 
make three suggestions for the future committee. 
209. Our first suggestion is related to our engineering report. We concluded, among other 
things, that engineering advice differs from science advice, that engineering advice is 
lacking in many policy areas across Government and that cross-departmental co-
ordination of engineering programmes is weak. We also suggested that the Government 
Chief Scientific Adviser, who is already Head of Profession for Science and Engineering, 
should be re-titled Government Chief Scientific and Engineering Adviser and that he 
should be supported by the Government Office for Science and Engineering. It is therefore 
logical that the Committee that is responsible for this policy area should have ‘engineering’ 
in its title. 
210. The current arrangement for the future Science and Technology Committee is the 
best that could be achieved following the machinery of Government changes. We 
suggest that following the general election the committee responsible for science, 
engineering and technology policy should be called the Science, Engineering and 
Technology Committee. 
211. Our second suggestion has to do with membership. This Committee was, unusually 
for a departmental committee, set up with a membership of 14, rather than 11. The 
rationale for the larger membership was that this would allow us to run a main committee 
on higher education, further education and skills, with a quorum of four, and a permanent 
sub-committee on science and technology, with a quorum of three, although we did not 
choose this arrangement. We had an effective membership of nine, but still with a quorum 
of four. We recognise that all select committees have been under tremendous pressures in 
terms of membership; over the years an increase in the number of government 
departments has increased the number of departmental select committees, and the 
establishment of the regional committees has exacerbated the problem further. However, it 
is essential that for effective scrutiny all political parties fill their places on select 
committees. 
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212. We suggest that the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should 
revert to its original 11 members with a quorum of three. 
213. Our final suggestion is to do with our remit, namely, to scrutinise the Government 
Office for Science. This means that the Committee remains a departmental committee. It 
also means that the science budget, Research Councils and publicly funded science-related 
bodies, such as the academies, NESTA, TSB and so on, fall within the remit of the future 
BIS Committee. These concerns were raised with the Deputy Leader of the House on 25 
June 2009. She replied: 
Let me re-emphasise that it is up to Committees to take a wide-ranging approach to 
their remit, and to examine the full scope of science policy and related matters across 
government. Earlier this week, a Hansard Society conference considered the role of 
departmental Select Committees. We have now moved beyond Departments turning 
around and saying to Select Committees, “We don’t want to answer that,” or, “You 
can’t look at that.” That should no longer occur in Select Committees. In the new 
spirit of reform, if a Select Committee decides that it wants to scrutinise research 
budgets, for example, it should be able to do so.198 
214. We welcome her acknowledgement that select committees should be free to conduct 
inquiries that extend beyond their official remit. However, that is different from saying that 
the future Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should have responsibility for 
the science budget. To avoid complications related to the lines of departmental 
responsibility and future machinery of Government changes, we suggest that following 
the next general election the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should 
be installed as a free-standing committee with a cross-departmental remit for science 
and engineering including research budgets across Government. 
 
198 HC Deb, 25 June 2009, col 1016 
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6 Conclusions 
215. There are lot of positives to take from our inquiry. We have been impressed by the 
seriousness with which the Government takes the issue of specialist advice from scientists 
and engineers. Significant strides have already been taken—for example, the increasing use 
of Chief Scientific Advisers and the growth of a scientific and engineering community in 
the civil service—and we were pleased to hear that the Government is planning to make 
further improvements, such as install a Chief Scientific Adviser in the Treasury.199 The 
recommendations we have made in the report will hopefully go some way to enhancing the 
good work that has already taken place. 
216. During the course of the inquiry, we have considered a number of important issues: 
the structures that deliver science and engineering advice; strategic priorities of research 
funding; consultation; funding principles; accountability and scrutiny. What we believe is 
missing is a broad vision for science and engineering in the UK; a vision for how science 
and engineering fits into the Government’s strategic plans for UK plc. We close this 
inquiry by urging the Government to raise its game. When it turns its attention to 
updating the Science Framework, we recommend that the Government consult widely 
with a view to producing a successor ten-year science and engineering strategy that is 
both tangible and ambitious. We suggest that built into this strategy—in the spirit of 
scientific and engineering endeavour—should be an assessment of what benefits, if any, 
are delivered by putting science and engineering at the heart of Government policy. 
 
199 Q 324 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Science and engineering at the heart of Government policy? 
1. We were impressed by the Science Minister and Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s 
frank assessment of how science and engineering advice is used in Government. We 
were pleased to hear that they have taken up those concerns we raised in the 
engineering report and that they have an appetite to improve the use of evidence in 
policy-making. (Paragraph 24) 
Previous recommendations and policy examples 
2. We regret that the Government failed to answer the core reasons for having 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers. We urge the Government to give fuller 
consideration to our recommendation that “Some departments should have 
Departmental Chief Engineering Advisers (DCEAs), some Departmental Chief 
Scientific Advisers (DCSAs), and some should have both.” (Paragraph 29) 
3. The Government had an opportunity at the last reshuffle to move GO-Science as per 
our recommendation in the engineering report. That it did not, was a missed 
opportunity. As the Government Chief Scientific Adviser explained, location matters 
because it affords daily face-to-face interaction between colleagues in the same 
building; and as he further pointed out, he has only seen the Prime Minster four times 
in the past year. We therefore appeal directly to the Prime Minster, who is responsible 
for GO-Science, to bring it into the Cabinet Office alongside the Strategy Unit. 
(Paragraph 37) 
4. We are reassured to hear that Professor Beddington will take steps to look at the 
MHRA’s decision to licence homeopathic products as well as the wider issue of the 
purchasing of homeopathy by the NHS. We hope that he will be able to bring scientific 
evidence to the centre of this complex policy issue. (Paragraph 42) 
5. We call on the DCSF Chief Scientific Adviser to explain what advice she provided, if 
any, on the Every Child literacy and numeracy programmes and report it to the House. 
(Paragraph 47) 
Science Advisory Councils/Committees 
6. We agree with Professor Beddington that Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers 
should have devolved responsibility for the quality of scientific advice in each 
department. On that basis, it is crucial that each DCSA has a tight grip on their 
departmental remits and have sufficient support so that problem policy areas can be 
identified and dealt with. The DCSA must challenge policy-makers to demonstrate 
clear evidence to support policy or to acknowledge that no such evidence exists. The 
GCSA needs to be advised by DCSAs of those instances where DCSAs have been 
overruled on such matters; and we further recommend that he publishes these in his 
annual report. (Paragraph 48) 
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7. Strong consideration should be given to increasing the number of departments that 
have Science Advisory Councils with a departmental remit. The Department of Health, 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for Transport are 
obvious ‘top-of-the-list’ candidates, with the latter two in particular needing high 
quality engineering advice. (Paragraph 54) 
8. SAC members should not be criticised for publishing scientific papers or making 
statements as professionals, independent of their role as Government advisers. 
(Paragraph 64) 
9. It is important to safeguard the independence of the advisory system. In situations 
where the independence of a SAC chairman or member is or might be threatened for 
political reasons, support should be offered by the DCSA and/or the GCSA.  
(Paragraph 67) 
10. We welcome the steps taken by the GCSA to deal with one incident that occurred 
between the Chairman of the ACMD and the Home Secretary. Further steps that 
should have been taken are: (1) the GSCA should have written or spoken to the 
Chairman of the ACMD, letting him know that support was being provided; (2) the 
correspondence between the GCSA and the Home Secretary should have been 
published immediately so that other SAC Chairmen and the public (including the 
science community) could see that support was being offered; and (3) the GCSA 
should have provided public support for the Chairman of the ACMD and for his right 
to publish.  (Paragraph 68) 
11. The Government should seek specialist advice prior to making policy decisions, early 
in the policy-making process. Clearly the Government should be free to reject the 
advice of its SACs, since scientific evidence is only one factor—albeit a very important 
one—in policy decisions: Advisers advise, Ministers decide. However, when the 
Government does take a different policy decision to that recommended by a SAC, it 
should make clear its reasons for doing so. (Paragraph 69) 
12. We conclude that there would be value in being clear in the Code of Practice as to what 
‘independence’ means. Members of Science Advisory Committees are likely to 
represent the views of their constituencies; what is important is that they have no 
conflict of interest with Government. Therefore, in the case of Science Advisory 
Committees, ‘independence’ should mean ‘independence from Government’. 
(Paragraph 73) 
13. We agree that SACs should recruit members based on competencies. However, we are 
concerned that dropping the term ‘lay’ removes an expectation that specialist advisory 
councils should have non-specialist members. Additionally, we are not convinced by 
the argument that scientists from one subject are necessarily a ‘lay’ person in another 
scientific area. Whether or not they are called ‘lay members’, non-specialists do have a 
lot to offer specialist committees. The presumption should be that SACs have lay/non-
specialist members. (Paragraph 78) 
14. We support the Code of Practice’s emphasis on the importance of publishing 
documents relating to the work of science advisory committees. We would prefer a 
slightly different emphasis on open meetings. Rather than recommending that SACs 
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“should aim to hold open meetings on a regular basis”, we suggest that SACs “should 
aim to hold the majority of their meetings in public, making use of new media 
wherever possible”. (Paragraph 82)  
15. We can see the logic and agree that it is important that SAC advice should be presented 
to Ministers in advance of publication, giving them sufficient time to consider a 
response. However, it is also clear that SAC advice should, when it is given to Ministers, 
be final advice, and not a launching pad for debate. On this basis, we recommend that 
the process of SACs providing evidence to Ministers should be as transparent as 
possible. SAC evidence that is presented to Ministers should subsequently be published 
in unaltered form, along with the date on which the evidence was presented to 
Ministers and the details of any requests for alterations or clarifications of the evidence. 
(Paragraph 84) 
16. We recommend that a small press office be set up within the Government Office for 
Science, to serve the press needs of GO-Science and all the Science Advisory 
Committees across Government. (Paragraph 86) 
Conclusion 
17. Shuffling the body responsible for providing cross-departmental science and 
engineering advice from one department to another and then back again within the 
space of two years is the opposite of ‘putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy’. It reduces science and engineering advice to, at best, a peripheral 
policy concern, and, at worst, a political bargaining chip. If science and engineering are 
to be successfully placed at the heart of policy, as the Government is keen to do, two 
things need to happen. First, the Government Office for Science (and Engineering, as 
we would have it) should have a stable home. We believe that this should be the 
Cabinet Office: the heart of Government. Second, there needs to be a Government 
Chief Engineer and a Government Chief Scientist, who are responsible for cross-
departmental advice and coordination, freeing up the Government Chief Scientific 
(and Engineering) Adviser to advise the Prime Minister more closely and to act as a 
public figurehead for science and engineering in the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 88)  
Debating strategic priorities 
18. We are left wondering what this strategic priorities debate was about and whether it 
has led to a major shift in Government policy. We are in favour of a discussion about 
how best to focus research funds so that the UK gets maximum reward from its 
investment, but the lesson to be learned is that the Government should be clear in its 
own mind about the format and goals of a debate before launching it.  (Paragraph 105) 
19. Past experience of failing to accurately ‘pick winners’ has led to a risk-averse executive. 
The belief that ‘sectors will pick themselves’ is misplaced and when proactive 
interventions by Government are not forthcoming, potentially successful industries 
that germinate in the UK, blossom elsewhere. Choosing to support one sector over 
another will be difficult. The Government should develop clear and agreed 
methodologies for determining priorities and acceptability of risk. (Paragraph 109) 
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20. If the Government is to develop clear and agreed methodologies for identifying areas of 
high priority, these must also be effective in identifying areas of low priority. Further, 
the Government should not prevaricate on this issue: if it decides to prioritise some 
areas of research it should come clean about which areas of research will see reduced 
investment. (Paragraph 111) 
21. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills should consider long-term 
investment returns when it considers strategic priorities in international partnerships. 
(Paragraph 114)  
22. Curiosity-driven research is a key component of a successful knowledge-economy. We 
strongly endorse the view that increased focus in applied research and industrial 
follow-through should not be at the expense of blue-skies research, which is one of the 
UK’s greatest strengths. (Paragraph 117) 
23. It is unlikely that the Science and Society consultation will contribute substantially to “a 
new strategy for the UK”: most of what has been said was either predictable or already 
government policy. However, we will watch the work of the Expert Groups with 
interest. (Paragraph 126)  
24. We welcome the Government’s commitment to consultation. It would be helpful if the 
Government was clearer about the reasons for each consultation and what was at stake. 
This would make the process more worthwhile for all concerned and would remove 
the feeling of ‘box-ticking’ that so often accompanies consultations.(Paragraph 132) 
25. In the case of the strategic-priorities debate, the benefits of a fast-moving process have 
been countered by a lack of coherence. Launching the debate with a Green Paper or 
something similar would have given a focus to the debate that was sorely lacking. We 
acknowledge that this would have elongated the timeframe for the debate, but since the 
intention was always for an on-going debate, this should not have been seen as a 
problem. (Paragraph 133)  
26. Any debate on strategic science funding should be put in the wider context of the role 
of science and engineering in the economic and social wellbeing of the UK. The 2004 
ten-year science and innovation framework was successful in focussing attention on 
the importance of science and innovation. We now suggest that the UK needs a 
‘national science and engineering strategy’. The Government should spend the last 
two-years of the ten-year framework (2012 and 2013) reviewing the science and 
innovation framework and consulting on a new strategy that will set out the direction 
of travel for science and engineering within UK plc from 2014 until 2024. (Paragraph 
137)  
The Haldane Principle 
27. The 2009 Budget Research Council savings have had an impact on the way that 
Research Councils allocate their funds. While this cannot be regarded as dictating 
‘detailed decisions’, it is not ‘over-arching strategy’ either; it is somewhere in between. 
(Paragraph 155) 
28. These ‘savings’ are in reality a strategic influencing of research funding streams. 
Whether or not it is the right thing to do is open to debate. But, either way, the 
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Government should communicate clearly what it is doing and not label them as 
something they are not. (Paragraph 156) 
29. To conclude, we are in favour of the idea that researchers are best placed to make 
detailed funding decisions on the one hand and, in principle, we support the 
Government to set the over-arching strategic direction on the other. However, it is 
necessary for the Government to spell out the relationship between these two notions 
for a broader funding principle to be of any use. (Paragraph 157) 
30. Research Councils are not, and never have been, the ‘guardians of the independence of 
science’. That responsibility has historically lain, and should remain, with the learned 
societies, universities and individual academics. (Paragraph 159) 
31. The Government’s refusal to give us confidential access to papers relevant to this 
inquiry is unacceptable. Without seeing the Science Budget Allocation letters, we are 
forced to speculate that the Government has exerted inappropriate influence over the 
Research Councils. However, we have been unable to confirm or deny this suspicion 
because of the Government’s contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph 165) 
32. Logically, the Government cannot support both the Excellence and Haldane Principles 
in their current form and be responsible for promoting science and engineering as a 
means of economic recovery and growth in the regions. The time is ripe for an 
unambiguous rationalisation of the two concepts. Researchers, industry, regional and 
national policy makers and the public have a right to know on what basis research 
funding is distributed both nationally and regionally; the rationale for funding 
decisions should be transparent and rigorous. The Government should adjust the 
framework for research funding and regional development so that it does not contain 
internal contradictions. (Paragraph 173)  
33. Science and engineering are crucial to the economic wellbeing of every region in the 
UK, and development strategies that have supported and made use of science and 
engineering have proven successful. In the consideration of UK science policy, it is 
essential that the regional dimension is clearly and publicly set out. It is important that 
the Government is able to communicate its role in regional development and in science 
policy, and especially the relationship between the two. It will only be able to do this if 
it resolves the conflict between its regional policies and the Haldane Principle. 
(Paragraph 176)  
34. The relationships between the Government and the research bodies that it funds 
should be both explicit and transparent. We recommend that the different streams of 
research funding are mapped and the nature of the contract between Government and 
the research bodies described. (Paragraph 181) 
35. We have already given our support for a more strategic approach to setting priorities in 
science funding, specifically at the applied end of the spectrum. Considering this issue 
in the context of the Haldane Principle highlights the need for a new approach to 
science funding that incorporates the good elements of Haldane in relation to basic 
science, but does not hinder a more mission-driven approach to get the full benefits of 
applied science and engineering. (Paragraph 185) 
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Science and engineering scrutiny 
36. The time has come for a new framework to replace the Haldane Principle (however it is 
understood) that adds transparency and rigour to the relationship between 
Government and the research community. It is important that the diversity of 
relationships between Government and the various bodies it funds to do research are 
included under a broad set of principles. We recommend that the Council for Science 
and Technology be commissioned to carry out this work. (Paragraph 188)  
37. Changes to the science and engineering scrutiny programme to make reviews shorter 
and mandatory are welcome. We recommend that there should be regular and 
constructive liaison between the newly formed Science and Technology Committee 
and the Science and Engineering Assurance team. (Paragraph 194) 
38. We would like to thank all those who made strong representation to the Leader of the 
House on our behalf. We also recognise the responsibility that derives from a 
consensus in Parliament and the science and engineering community that science and 
technology scrutiny matters. We will strive to make the work of the new Committee—
which is essential for the democratic scrutiny of science, engineering and technology—
relevant, rigorous and transparent. (Paragraph 207) 
39. The current arrangement for the future Science and Technology Committee is the best 
that could be achieved following the machinery of Government changes. We suggest 
that following the general election the committee responsible for science, engineering 
and technology policy should be called the Science, Engineering and Technology 
Committee. (Paragraph 210)  
40. We suggest that the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should revert to 
its original 11 members with a quorum of three. (Paragraph 212)  
41. To avoid complications related to the lines of departmental responsibility and future 
machinery of Government changes, we suggest that following the next general election 
the Science, Engineering and Technology Committee should be installed as a free-
standing committee with a cross-departmental remit for science and engineering 
including research budgets across Government. (Paragraph 214)  
Conclusions 
42. We close this inquiry by urging the Government to raise its game. When it turns its 
attention to updating the Science Framework, we recommend that the Government 
consult widely with a view to producing a successor ten-year science and engineering 
strategy that is both tangible and ambitious. We suggest that built into this strategy—in 
the spirit of scientific and engineering endeavour—should be an assessment of what 
benefits, if any, are delivered by putting science and engineering at the heart of 
Government policy. (Paragraph 216) 
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Appendix: correspondence regarding the 
Science Budget Allocations letters  
Letter dated 23 February 2009 from the Department for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills to Mr Phil Willis MP, Chairman of the Committee 
Thank you for your letter of 27 January to Andrew Shaw, requesting copies of the 
Allocation Letters from the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills to the 
Research Councils with respect to the Science Budget Allocations 2008/09–2010/11 for the 
seven UK Research Councils. I am replying as Andrew Shaw has now left the Department. 
Upon receipt of a written request for information the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
(“the Act”) obliges this Department to (a) say whether we hold the information requested 
and if we do (b) to disclose it. However, these obligations are subject to exemptions which, 
where applicable, permit us to withhold information. If an absolute exemption applies then 
we can simply withhold the information. If a qualified exemption applies then we can only 
withhold the information if the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the 
public interest its disclosure. 
While I can confirm that we hold the information you have requested we are not prepared 
to disclose it because it is exempt from disclosure under sections 35, and 43 of the Act as 
explained below. 
Section 35—This exempts information held by a government department if it relates to 
the formulation or development of government policy. Section 35 is a qualified exemption. 
We have considered carefully whether the public interest in disclosing the information 
overrides the public interest in maintaining the exemption and withholding the 
information. We recognise there is a general public interest in the disclosure of 
information as greater transparency makes Government more accountable and we also 
recognise there is a public interest in being able to assess the quality of information which 
is used in policy formulation.  
However, against this good government depends on good decision making and there is a 
clear public interest in ensuring that decisions are made based on the best advice available 
and a full consideration of all the options. Not only is it important that Research Councils 
provide us with full and detailed information but it is also essential that policy officials are 
able to have a full and frank dialogue with them on budgetary issues. If details of these 
communications were made public we consider that the Councils might be less open with 
us and policy officials would not have the space to discuss such issues freely. 
We have also taken into account that details of the overall strategic priorities for the 
research base and related funding decisions (including the rationale behind them) are set 
out in the “Science Budget” allocations booklet which is published after the outcome of 
each spending review. There follows a link to this at 
http://www.dius.gov.uk/publications/URN07114.pdf. 
Simultaneously Research Councils published their delivery plans 2008-2001 at 
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/aboutrcuk/deliveryplan. 
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These delivery plans set out each Council’s approach to research priorities, sustainability, 
economic impact, international, specific financial commitment information and targets for 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
In our view, therefore, the balance of the public interest clearly lies in withholding the 
information you have requested. 
Section 43—this exempts information if disclosure would, or would be likely to, 
prejudice the commercial interests of any person. This is a qualified exemption. You will 
understand that, in budgetary discussions, Research Councils share with us a good deal of 
information relating to development plans that they have which by its very nature is not in 
the public domain, is commercially sensitive and the disclosure of which would, or would 
be likely to, prejudice their commercial interests.  
While we recognise that there is a general public interest in disclosure of information 
relating to how budgets are agreed, for largely the same reasons as articulated above 
regarding the exemption in section 35 we consider the balance of the public interest in this 
case falls in favour of withholding the information. In particular, we consider that good 
decision making depends upon the quality of the information on which it is based and we 
are concerned that if Research Councils felt we might disclose information that they regard 
as commercially sensitive then they will be less frank with us in the future and that would 
damage the decision making process. 
Accompanying this letter are details of our appeals procedure if you are unhappy with the 
result of your request for information. Please quote the reference number above in any 
future communications. 
Letter dated 24 February 2009 from Mr Phil Willis MP, Chairman of the 
Committee, to the Rt Hon John Denham MP, Secretary of State for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills 
I am writing to ask that you provide the Committee with copies of the Allocation Letters 
sent to the seven UK Research Councils with respect to the Science Budget Allocations 
2008/09–2010/11.  
The reasons for this request are two-fold. First, concerns over the extent to which the 
Government influenced the formulation of the Research Councils’ Delivery plans continue 
to be raised with the Committee. An examination of the Allocation letters would allow us 
to lay this matter to rest. Second, the Allocation letters sent to HEFCE and the Learning 
and Skills Council are published as a matter of course. It therefore seems anomalous that 
the Research Councils’ letters are not made public, and in the interests of transparency we 
believe they should be placed in the public domain.     
I would also like to point out that I have written to the Department previously  asking that 
the Allocation letters be made available to the Committee under the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 (letter dated 27 January 2009). I am disappointed to say that despite 
more than 28 days elapsing since this request I have had no reply. 
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As an interim measure, I would ask for the letters to be supplied to us in confidence. As 
you will know it is well precedented for Committees to be supplied with information on 
this basis. 
Letter dated 20 March 1009 from The Rt Hon John Denham MP, 
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, to Mr Phil 
Willis MP, Chairman of the Committee 
Thank you for your letter of 24 February, in which you requested copies of the allocation 
letters sent to the seven Research Councils be provided to your Committee. 
The Government explained in its response to the Innovation, Universities, Science and 
Skills Select Committee in June 2008 that it did not intend to publish its specific 
interactions with Councils on the allocations process and that remains our position. 
As you are aware the Department has published the booklet on Science Allocations (which 
is the equivalent of the published Allocation letters sent to the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England and the Learning and Skills Council) and at the same time the 
Councils produced their own delivery plans. 
A letter was sent to you on 23 February in response to your Freedom of Information 
request and this clearly outlined why it would be inappropriate to release these letters. 
I hope the above information is helpful. 
Letter dated 2 April 2009 From Mr Phil Willis MP, Chairman of the 
Committee, to the Rt Hon John Denham MP, Secretary of State for 
Innovation, Universities & Skills 
I have received your letter of 20 March 2009. 
I am disappointed by the Department’s continued refusal to supply us with copies of the 
allocation letters sent to the Research Councils.  The Committee will discuss what action to 
take after Easter. 
In the meantime I repeat the request, made in my letter to you dated 24 February, that “As 
an interim measure, I would ask for the letters to be supplied to us in confidence. As you 
will know it is well precedented for Committees to be supplied with information on this 
basis.” 
E-mail dated 29 April 2009 from Secretary of State’s Private Office, 
Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills, to the Clerk of the 
Committee  
I understand that you were asking for a response to Phil Willis’ letter of 2 April to the 
Secretary of State, John Denham, regarding science budget allocation letters.  
 The Secretary of State has confirmed that his position has not changed since his letter of 
20th March to Phil Willis. Please see correspondence attached for ease of reference. 
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E-mail dated 5 May 2009 from the Clerk of the Committee to the 
Secretary of State’s Private Office, Department of Innovation, 
Universities and Skills 
Thank you for your email. 
I wonder if this has been sent to me in error.  It is not normal practice for a reply to a letter 
from a Chairman of a Select Committee to a Secretary of State to be received in the form of 
an official-to-official email.  In addition I’d point out that the email does not address the 
specific question in the Chairman’s letter. 
 The Chairman looks forward to receiving the Secretary of State’s reply. 
E-mail dated 8 May 2009 from Secretary of State’s Private Office, 
Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills, to the Clerk of the 
Committee 
The Secretary of State asked me to convey his response to you, which I did. As far as we are 
concerned no further response is needed. 
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Formal Minutes 
Wednesday 8 July 2009 
Members present: 
Mr Phil Willis, in the Chair 
Mr Tim Boswell 
Dr Evan Harris 
Mr Gordon Marsden 
 Dr Brian Iddon 
Ian Stewart 
Graham Stringer 
The Committee deliberated.  
Draft Report (Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy), 
proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 77 read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 78 read. 
Amendment proposed, in line 6, leave out from “committees” to the end of the 
paragraph.—(Dr Evan Harris.) 
Question put, That the Amendment be made. 
The Committee divided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amendment disagreed to. 
Paragraph agreed to. 
Paragraphs 79 to 217 read and agreed to. 
Summary agreed to. 
Ayes, 1 
 
Dr Evan Harris 
 
Noes, 5 
 
Mr Tim Boswell 
Dr Brian Iddon 
Mr Gordon Marsden 
Ian Stewart 
Graham Stringer 
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Resolved, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report. 
 
[Adjourned till Monday 13 July at 4.00pm 
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Witnesses 
Monday 26 January 2009 Page 
Rt Hon Lord Drayson, a Member of the House of Lords, Minister of State for 
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